Volume 13
Issue 2 Spring 1983
Spring 1983

Civil Procedure
Ted Occhialino

Recommended Citation
Ted Occhialino, Civil Procedure, 13 N.M. L. Rev. 251 (1983).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol13/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

CIVIL PROCEDURE
MARIO E. OCCHIALINO*

INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico courts decided approximately seventy cases involving
civil procedure law during the Survey year. Not all of the cases are
considered in this article. All of the cases decided can be found in the
Table of Cases at the back of this issue. The cases that are discussed are
organized in this article according to the sequence followed in a single
law suit.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

New Mexico, like most states, 1 has only limited subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases that involve Indian parties or acts occurring on
reservation land. Resolution of jurisdictional issues is complicated by the
multitude of tests that are applied, by the differing rights acquired by
each tribe through treaty or statute, and by the complex interplay of
competing interests among the states, the federal government, and the
Indian governments.2
In Hartley v. Baca,3 the New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that
New Mexico courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction in actions in which
an Indian commits a tort injuring a non-Indian within the boundaries of
the Indian's reservation. The court applied the "infringement" test which
the United States Supreme Court adopted in Williams v. Lee,4 and concluded that the assertion of state jurisdiction would impermissibly infringe
"on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them." 5
The Hartley decision is in accord with that of other jurisdictions which
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1.A minority of states acquired jurisdiction over litigation involving Indians and Indian land as
1979); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1976);
a result of federal legislation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62 (Supp. 111
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. See generally W. Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 162-72 (1981).
3. 97 N.M. 441, 640 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1981).
4. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). The New Mexico Supreme Court applied the infringement test in
Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 561 P.2d 476 (1977).
5. 97 N.M. at 443, 640 P.2d at 943 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220).
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have considered the issue. 6 It is logically inconsistent with an earlier

ruling of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Paiz v. Hughes.7 In Paiz,
the court concluded that there was no infringement of Indian interests
when the state district court accepted jurisdiction in an action in which
Indians sued a non-Indian driver of an automobile involved in an auto
accident on an Indian reservation.8
Hartley sought to resolve a question which frequently arises in New
Mexico due to the state's large Indian population and substantial Indian
lands within its borders. The court of appeals, however, cannot bring
order to this complex question of state court jurisdiction in cases involving
Indian interests. 9 Only the supreme court can reconcile Hartley with its
own previous opinions which have addressed similar issues.' 0
Hartley is a victory for proponents of expanded Indian sovereignty.
By denying state courts jurisdiction, the decision enhances the power and
responsibilities of the tribal courts. Tribal courts will be called upon to
resolve the bulk of cases in which an Indian is sued by a non-Indian for
a tort committed on the reservation. ' Some Indian reservations lack a
formal court structure and a well-defined body of law to apply in tort
cases.'" The increase in tribal court jurisdiction which Hartley authorizes
6. See, e.g., Enriquez v. Superior Court, 115 Ariz. 342, 565 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1977) (action
against an Indian for injuries in an auto accident on the reservation); Schantz v. White Lightning,
231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1975) (action against Indians for injuries in an auto accident on the reservation).
7. 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966).
8. In Paiz, the Indian plaintiffs had chosen to sue in state court. The court suggested that it might
be a violation of equal protection to bar Indian plaintiffs from state court. Id. at 564, 417 P.2d at
52. The court concluded that assertion of state jurisdiction "will not affect the rights of the JicarillaApache Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them ...." Id. at 566, 417 P.2d at 5354. That conclusion is erroneous. The court undercuts Indian sovereignty by accepting jurisdiction
whenever individual Indian plaintiffs proceed in state court. Not only are Indian courts bypassed,
but the state court will ignore choice of law principles calling for Indian tort law to be applied, and
will probably apply New Mexico tort law in New Mexico's court. But see Jim v. CIT Financial
Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (New Mexico gives full faith and credit to
Indian law).
Paiz is inconsistent with the rationale expressed in Hartley and should be reconsidered by the
supreme court. Denying individual Indians access to state court in order to preserve tribal sovereignty
would not improperly discriminate against Indian litigants. See Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 476,
362 P.2d 1004 (1961) (Indian plaintiff denied access to state court when suing Indian defendant for
an on-reservation tort).
9. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973) (court of appeals may not overrule
supreme court precedents).
10. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
II. In some of these cases, the parties will be of diverse citizenship. Whether the federal courts
will accept jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship where the state court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction is an open question. Compare Poitra v. DeMarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975) (diversity jurisdiction exists) with Hot Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hall, 366
F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966) (federal court lacks jurisdiction if state court lacks jurisdiction).
12. See generally Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Tribal Law Codes (R.
Johnson ed. 1981) (available at the University of New Mexico School of Law). Indeed, it is not
clear whether the Santa Clara Pueblo, where the events in Hartley occurred, has a formal system
of tort law.
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may act as an incentive to tribal governments to restructure their dispute
resolution systems. If tribal courts are unwilling or unable to entertain
such actions and enforce their judgments, 3 New Mexico might conclude
that the tribes have waived their interests in self-government and may
seek to assert state court jurisdiction. 14
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The New Mexico courts did not render any significant decisions concerning the reach of the state's long-arm statute 5 this year. Instead, the
courts focused upon the question of who bears the burden of proof that
jurisdiction exists or is lacking. 6 In addition, the supreme court reaffirmed
the rule that a party waives its claim that jurisdiction is lacking if it
requests affirmative relief in an action in which it asserts the absence of
jurisdiction. The cases illustrate the procedural problems that confront
the court and the parties when attacks are made on the jurisdiction of the
court.
New Mexico does not require that the plaintiff assert in the complaint
that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant exists. 17 Rule 12 provides
that a defendant who wishes to assert that personal jurisdiction is lacking
must do so in its initial response to the complaint. 18 The initial response
may be either a motion or an answer to the complaint.' 9 The trial court
13. Tribal courts will be able to enforce judgments entered against tribal members to the extent
that the judgment debtor has property within the reservation subject to execution. Whether tribal
court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in the state courts is less clear. See generally
Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M.L. Rev.
133 (1977). New Mexico courts have suggested in other contexts that the full faith and credit clause
is applicable to Indian laws and governments. Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362,
533 P.2d 751 (1975); Chischilly v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 96 N.M. 264, 629 P.2d 340
(Ct. App. 1980). See also Joe v. Marcum, 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
14. Hartley relegates non-Indian plaintiffs to tribal courts. If the tribal court lacks jurisdiction or
declines to exercise jurisdiction, the non-Indian would be without a forum unless the state court of
New Mexico opened its courts to the suit after the tribal court declined jurisdiction. The theoretical
justification for reasserting jurisdiction would be that by declining jurisdiction, the tribal government
had demonstrated a lack of interest in the controversy. It could be argued that no impingement of
Indian sovereignty occurs when the state court provides a forum in cases in which the Indian
government does not.
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978). In Plumbers Specialty Supply Co. v. Enterprise Products
Co., 96 N.M. 517, 632 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1981), the court of appeals concluded that a manufacturer
was engaged in the "transaction of business" in New Mexico when it solicited business in New
Mexico and shipped products into New Mexico "on a regular basis." Id. at 520, 632 P.2d at 755.
The decision merely applies previously expressed legal principles to the facts presented.
16. The cases discussed in this section deal with the burden of proof issue when the existence
of personal jurisdiction is questioned. In addition, the court of appeals this year held that the party
denying that subject matter jurisdiction exists bears the burden of proof. Hartley v. Baca, 97 N.M.
441, 640 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1981).
17. N.M. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires a proper allegation of venue but does not mention jurisdiction.
Complaints, however, frequently contain a jurisdictional allegation. See, e.g., Plumbers Specialty
Supply Co. v. Enterprise Products Co., 96 N.M. 517, 520, 632 P.2d 752, 755 (Ct. App. 1981).
18. N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
19. Id.
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may determine the jurisdictional issue prior to trial or may defer the
question until the trial. 2"
In 1978, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that the burden was
upon the plaintiff to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction when
the defendant properly raised the issue. 2' In Plumber's Specialty Supply
Co. v. Enterprise Products Co.,22 the court of appeals expressed "reservations" about a procedure that could force the plaintiff to establish a
portion of his substantive case in advance of trial. 23 The court of appeals
would have preferred to shift the burden to the defendant to prove the
absence of jurisdiction when the court would be determining that issue
prior to trial.24
Early in the proceedings, the plaintiff may not be fully apprised of the
scope of the defendant's activities relevant to the jurisdictional claim.
When the district court determines that the plaintiff needs access to additional information to meet the defendant's pretrial attack on jurisdiction,
the court can postpone the hearing on the issue pending further discovery
by the plaintiff. 25 Permitting expedited discovery or deferring the date for
hearing the motion are adequate remedies. Making the burden of proof
dependent on the time the issue is heard is unduly cumbersome and
unnecessary.
New Mexico once followed the rule that a defendant who attacked the
jurisdiction of the court must enter a "special appearance" limiting his
defense solely to the claim of lack of jurisdiction. 26 If the defendant by
its conduct "recognize[d] the case as in court" either by seeking "some
affirmative relief at the hands of the court, or . . . ask[ing] a favorable
decision upon some matter of a substantive character, or endeavor[ing]
to secure a continuance or postponement," the defendant's conduct con20. Rule 12 provides that the attack on jurisdiction "whether made in a pleading or by motion
. . . shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial." N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
21. State ex rel. Anaya v. Columbia Research Corp., 92 N.M. 104, 583 P.2d 468 (1978).
22. 96 N.M. 517, 632 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1981).
23. Id. at 520, 632 P.2d at 755. The court felt obliged to follow the New Mexico Supreme Court's
ruling to the contrary in State ex rel. Anaya v. Columbia Research Corp., 92 N.M. 104, 583 P.2d
468 (1972). See Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973) (court of appeals may
not overrule supreme court precedents). For a discussion of Plumbers Specialty from a different
aspect, see Otten and McBride, Torts, post at 473.
24. 96 N.M. at 520, 632 P.2d at 755.
25. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Courts have the power to limit the scope of discovery to matters
relevant to the jurisdictional issues presented by motion. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4). See, e.g.,
Investment Properties Int'l Ltd. v. 1OS, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972); State ex rel. Deere &
Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1970). The plaintiff, however, must make at least a prima
facie showing that jurisdiction exists before discovery will be permitted to proceed on the issue.
Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termoteenica Campana, S.p.A., 358 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
26. State ex rel. Northwestern Colonization & Improvement Co. v. Huller, 23 N.M. 306, 168
P. 528 (1917); Dailey v. Foster, 17 N.M. 377, 128 P. 71 (1912).

Spring 19831

CIVIL PROCEDURE

stituted a waiver of its jurisdictional arguments. 27 Rule 12 continues the
requirement that the defendant raise the issue of the absence of personal
jurisdiction in the initial pleading or motion, but expressly permits the
defendant to join the jurisdictional claim to other "defenses or objections"
the defendant may possess. 28 Joinder of substantive defenses with jurisdictional defenses does not constitute a waiver. 29 Likewise, combining
the jurisdictional defense with procedural defenses such as opposition to
a motion to consolidate should not constitute a waiver either.3° The protection of Rule 12, limited to permitting the joinder of "objections or
defenses" 3 does not extend to situations where affirmative relief is sought.
Thus, where defendants seek and obtain permission to file a third party
claim32 they waive the jurisdictional defenses which they had raised in
their answers. 3 The court of appeals has also suggested that if a defendant
files a permissive counterclaim, or a crossclaim, a waiver of the jurisdictional defense occurs. 34
Less clear and worthy of judicial clarification when the occasion arises,
is whether a defendant who seeks the benefit of procedural rulings from
the court, but not affirmative substantive relief, thereby waives its jurisdictional defense. In 1924, the New Mexico Supreme Court suggested
that merely seeking a continuance or the postponement of a hearing
constituted a request for affirmative judicial relief inconsistent with a
claim of lack of jurisdiction.3 5 This decision has never been repudiated.
New Mexico's pattern of strict construction of the rule permitting joinder
of defenses or objections leaves unsettled whether action as innocuous
27. Hammond v. District Court, 30 N.M. 130, 137. 228 P. 758, 761 (1924).
28. N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides that: "No defense or objection [including lack of personal
or subject matter jurisdiction] is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections
in a responsive pleading or motion."
29. Contra Meeker v. Walker, 80 N.M. 280, 454 P.2d 762 (1969). The court in Meeker held that
the joinder of substantive defenses in a motion attacking jurisdiction constituted a general appearance.
In Williams v. Arcoa Int'l, Inc.. 86 N.M. 288, 523 P.2d 23 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 281.
523 P.2d 16 (1974), the court distinguished Meeker because the opinion did not specifically address
N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Williams held that a defendant did not waive a defense of no jurisdiction
over the person by joining it with other defenses.
30. In Hammond v. District Court, 30 N.M. 130, 228 P. 758 (1924), the supreme court ruled
that defendants did not waive their jurisdictional defense by opposing a motion to consolidate cases.
To waive jurisdictional defenses already asserted, "the defendant must seek some affirmative relief
at the hands of the court, or he must seek a favorable decision upon some matter of a substantive
character, or endeavor to secure a continuance or postponement." Id. at 137. 228 P. at 761. Because
"[tihey merely presented legal objections to an action then being taken by the court without their
request or solicitation . . . it cannot be said that the defendants entered a general appearance .
Id.
31. N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
32. N.M. R. Civ. P. 14.
33. Williams v. Arcoa Int'l, Inc., 86 N.M. 288, 523 P.2d 23 (Ct. App.), cert. denied. 86 N.M.
281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974).
34. Id. See generally C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1397 (1969).
35. Hammond v. District Court, 30 N.M. 130, 137, 228 P. 758, 761 (1924). See supra note 30.
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as asking for an extension of time to file an answer,3 6 filing a motion for
a more definite statement,37 making a demand for a jury trial, 38 or even
seeking a court order authorizing discovery related to the jurisdictional
defense,3 9 could be treated as a request for affirmative relief.
On two occasions this year the supreme court determined that defendants in domestic relations cases had gone beyond permissible limits by
seeking relief inconsistent with their assertions that jurisdiction was lacking. In each case the court concluded that the defendant spouse waived
her jurisdictional defense. In State ex rel. Valles v. Brown,4" the defendant
entered a "special appearance" contesting the jurisdiction of the New
Mexico court to grant a divorce or determine custody. At the same time,
the defendant sought full faith and credit in the New Mexico proceeding
for an earlier divorce and custody decree of the state of Arizona. The
supreme court held that the defendant's request that the New Mexico
court give full faith and credit to the Arizona decree constituted a waiver
of the jurisdictional defense. 4 The supreme court could have defended
the decision on the ground that seeking full faith and credit for the Arizona
decree constituted a request for affirmative relief which, in accordance
with New Mexico precedent, 2 waived any jurisdictional defenses. The
court did not do so. Instead, the court quoted with approval language
from an old opinion which suggested that any action by the defendant
beyond an attack on jurisdiction constituted a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction.43
In Murphy v. Murphy,' the supreme court further confused the jurisdictional waiver issue. Murphy involved complex and confusing multistate divorce litigation which culminated in a New Mexico proceeding
36. N.M. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
37. N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
38. N.M. R. Civ. P. 38(a) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
39. Many discovery devices are available to a defendant without seeking the court's permission.
Motions for physical or mental examinations, however, require a prior court order, N.M. R. Civ.
P. 35(a), as do motions to depose a prisoner, N.M. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Moreover, a defendant seeking
to assure attendance of a witness at a deposition might obtain a subpoena from the court, N.M. R.
Civ. P. 45, an act which might be considered a request for affirmative relief.
40. __ N.M. __, 639 P.2d 1181 (1981). Valles Was consolidated for purposes of appeal with
Miller v. Love, No. 13707. The special appearance question discussed in the text arose in Miller v.
Love. For further discussion of these two cases, see Kelsey & Siegel, Domestic Relations, post at
379 [hereinafter cited as Kelsey & Siegel] and Note, Domestic Relations-An Interpretation of the
ParentalKidnapping PreventionAct of 1980: State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, post at 527.
41. __ N.M. at -, 639 P.2d at 1185.
42. Williams v. Arcoa Int'l, Inc., 86 N.M. 288, 523 P.2d 23 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M.
281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974).
639 P.2d at 1185 (citing State ex rel. Northwestern Colonization and
43. __ N.M. at _,
Improvement Co. v. Huller, 23 N.M. 306, 330, 168 P. 528, 535 (1917) (appearance deemed "general"
whenever defendant "has brought into question" matters other than the jurisdiction of the court)).
44. 96 N.M. 401, 631 P.2d 307 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Kelsey & Siegel,
supra note 40, at 379.
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at which the husband was ordered to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court. The husband entered a "special appearance"
in order to assert that the court lacked jurisdiction over his person. When
the district court did not rule in his favor on the jurisdictional claim, the
defendant "participated in the hearing on the merits on the order to show
cause." 45 The supreme court concluded that the husband's attorney, by
cross-examining witnesses and calling the husband to testify, waived the
jurisdictional defense.46
The ruling is inconsistent with Rule 12, which permits combining
substantive defenses with attacks on jurisdiction. 47 Under Murphy, defending on the merits after the trial court rejects the defense of lack of
jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of the right to assert on appeal that the
trial court erred in concluding that jurisdiction existed. After Murphy, a
defendant who has a jurisdictional defense is reduced to a single procedural option: he must raise the jurisdictional defense by motion prior to
answer, insist that the court hear and decide the motion prior to tri~l, and
immediately appeal an adverse decision by the trial court. 48 Any other
course of conduct would seem to result in a waiver of his jurisdidtional
claim.
The supreme court should focus upon this issue and definitively state
the applicable law. At a minimum, the court should affirm that Rule 12
authorizes combining of substantive defenses and objections with jurisdictional claims without waiver of the latter. The court should also specify
the type of conduct which goes beyond the presentation of a defense and
constitutes the forbidden request for affirmative relief.4 9
45. 96 N.M. at 405, 631 P.2d at 311.
46. Id. In all other contexts, the court insists that "waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right." Marquez v. Juan Tafoya Land Corp., 96 N.M. 503, 505, 632 P.2d 738, 740 (1981)
(citing Ed Black's Chevrolet Center, Inc. v. Melichar, 81 N.M. 602, 471 P.2d 172 (1970)). Yet
New Mexico courts do not require that the defendant knowingly waive the right to preserve the
jurisdictional defense. Indeed, in many cases, the doctrine of waiver is applied to defendants who
insist that their conduct was not intended as a waiver. E.g., Williams v. Arcoa Int'l, Inc., 86 N.M.
288, 523 P.2d 23 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 281, 523 P.2d 16 (1974). In Murphy, however,
the trial judge did issue "continuous warnings" that participation in the examination of a witness
would constitute a waiver of objections to jurisdiction. 96 N.M. at 405, 631 P.2d at 311.
47. See supra note 28.
48. The defendant could seek a writ of prohibition in the supreme court on the ground that the
trial court is about to proceed in the absence of personal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Bosson & Sanders,
The Writ of Prohibitionin New Mexico, 5 N.M.L. Rev. 91 (1974), or could appeal with the permission
of the district court judge if the judge will certify the question for immediate review, N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 39-3-4 (1978).
49. The court could go further. It could rule that even defendants who seek affirmative relief do
not thereby waive the defense of lack of jurisdiction. If the trial court were to rule on jurisdictional
challenges prior to trial, no harm to the judicial process would result from permitting a defendant
to attack jurisdiction while seeking affirmative relief in the alternative. If the trial court ruled that
jurisdiction was lacking, it could dismiss the entire action, including the defendant's claim for
affirmative relief. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-14 (1978) (permitting suits to be refiled for six months
after dismissal without regard to statute of limitations). If the trial court denies the motion to dismiss,
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VENUE 50

The general venue statute provides that actions may be brought in the
county where any party resides. 5' Determination of the residence of corporate parties poses special problems. Domestic corporations are treated
as residents of the state of their incorporation. 52 No New Mexico decision
has established a test for determining the county within the state in which
a domestic corporation resides. Whether, for venue purposes, a domestic
corporation resides in the county listed in the incorporation papers as the
site for its registered office,

53

or at its principal place of business, 54 is

unclear.
When a foreign corporation is a defendant, the venue statute prohibits
the use of the residence of the corporation as a basis for venue. 55 Instead,
the residence of the statutory agent of the corporation is treated as the
residence of the corporation. 56 The statute does not address the question
of whether a foreign corporation which is a plaintiff in a lawsuit can
establish venue on the basis of its residence. In Aetna Finance Co. v.
Gutierrez,5 7 the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that the venue
statute prohibits the use of the foreign corporation's residence as a basis
the defendant could be required to immediately appeal the decision. Only if the defendant loses his
jurisdictional argument at trial, declines to appeal immediately, and instead defends on the merits,
should the court find that the defendant waived the jurisdictional claim.
50. In In re Ruther, 96 N.M. 462, 631 P.2d 1330 (Ct. App. 1981), the New Mexico Court of
Appeals considered an issue involving change of venue in probate proceedings. The Probate Code
provides that venue shall lie initially in the county where the decedent was domiciled at the time of
his death. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-3-201(A) (1978). Thereafter, the proceeding may be transferred to
any other New Mexico Court "[i]f a court finds that [it is] in the interest of justice" to do so. N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 45-1-303(C) (1978). In Ruther, the trial court order transferring the proceeding pursuant
to this section did not contain an explicit finding that the transfer was in the interest of justice. The
court of appeals held that where no objection to the order was made at the time it was issued, the
transfer of venue was valid, and the parties could not later object to it. 96 N.M. at 465, 631 P.2d
at 1333.
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1982). In addition to authorizing venue in the county
of a party's residence, the statute lays venue in the county where the cause of action originated,
where the debt sued on was incurred, or where the contract sued on was made or was to be performed.
Id.
52. See, e.g., Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 270 U.S. 363 (1926).
53. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-11-11 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The statute provides that each corporation
shall maintain "a registered office which may be, but need not be, the same as its place of business."
Id. In Reliable Display Corp. v. Maro Indus., Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 747, 325 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct.
1971), the New York Supreme Court concluded that a domestic corporation resided at the site listed
in the articles of incorporation even though it thereafter removed its entire operation to a different
county.
54. The federal venue statute establishes the judicial district in which a corporation "is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business" as its residence for venue purposes. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (c) (1976). By analogy, perhaps a domestic corporation is a resident of every county in which
it is doing business. A corporation is doing business in a district where it is "engaging in any
substantial business operations" or "carrying on any substantial part of its activities." Pocahontas
Supreme Coal Co. v. National Mines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 67, 69 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-3-1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
56. Id. § 38-3-1(F).
57. 96 N.M. 538, 632 P.2d 1176 (1981).
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for laying venue. When a foreign corporation is a plaintiff, venue is
proper only where a defendant resides, where the contract was made or
to be performed, or where the cause of action originated. 8 This construction of the venue statute provides fewer alternatives to a foreign corporation plaintiff than to a domestic corporation in similar circumstances.
The supreme court rejected the argument that this discrepancy in treatment
constituted a violation of equal protection. 9
The court need not have reached the result it did. Although it correctly
interpreted the language of the venue statute standing alone, 6" consideration of a more recently enacted statute would have supported a different
conclusion. A provision in the foreign corporation statute6 provides that
a foreign corporation which has properly registered to do business in New
Mexico shall "enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a
"62 Had the court focused on this language, it
domestic corporation ..
might have concluded that the intent of the legislature was to provide
foreign corporations which initiated litigation the same right to litigate
63
in the county of their residence as is enjoyed by domestic corporations.
JUDGE SELECTION

Parties have often used the New Mexico statute permitting each party
to disqualify one judge from hearing the case 64 to "judge shop." 65 In the
past, the New Mexico Supreme Court did little to limit the scope of the
58. Id. at 541, 632 P.2d at 1179. Although the supreme court did not mention it, the general
venue statute permits venue to be laid where the plaintiff or defendant reside "or some one of them
in case there be more than one." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982). When a foreign
corporation joins as a co-plaintiff with a domestic corporation or New Mexico individual, venue
will be proper at the residence of the corporation's co-plaintiff. See Torres v. Gamble, 75 N.M.
741, 410 P.2d 959 (1966).
59. 96 N.M. at 541-42, 632 P.2d at 1179-80. The New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed and
applied the leading case on point, American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 U.S. 637 (1976). In
Starnes, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of a Texas venue statute against an
equal protection challenge. The statute permitted plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations in any county
in the state, but limited the sites of actions against domestic corporations.
60. The supreme court's interpretation of the statutory language was straightforward: "The language of the Legislature controls. . . . The plain grammatical meaning of Subsection F is that foreign
corporations are nonresidents." 96 N.M. at 541, 632 P.2d at 1179.
61. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-17-2 (1978). The provision was enacted into law in 1967. 1967 N.M.
Laws, ch. 81, § 104. The provision in the general venue statute dealing with foreign corporations
was enacted twelve years earlier. 1955 N.M. Laws, ch. 258.
62. N.M. Stat. Ann. §53-17-2 (1978).
63. The supreme court felt bound to accept a literal interpretation of the general statute, see supra
note 60, because "[nlocontrary intention appears." 96 N.M. at541, 632 P.2d at 1179. The legislative
mandate of equal treatment for foreign and domestic corporations could have been construed as
supplying a legislative intent contrary to that expressed in the general venue statute. But see, e.g.,
Saiz v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 746, 748, 487 P.2d 174, 176 (Ct. App. 1971), overruled on
other grounds, Galvan v. City of Albuquerque, 87 N.M. 235, 531 P.2d 1208 (1975) ("a general
act later enacted does not affect an earlier special act").
64. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Albuquerque Journal, Jan. 9, 1981, at BI, col. 1.
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statute.66 This year, however, the supreme court narrowly construed the
statute to prohibit parties from peremptorily disqualifying judges who are
specially assigned to the case by the Chief Justice of the supreme court.
The disqualification statute provides that a party may disqualify "the
resident judge or a judge designated by the resident judge," and authorizes
the Chief Justice to appoint a judge of another district to hear a case in
which a disqualification has occurred. 67 In Vigil v. Reese,6" several defendants were scheduled to be tried jointly in Santa Fe County. After two
district court judges were disqualified without cause, 69 the acting Chief
Justice of the supreme court appointed a judge from a different judicial
district to hear the case. One of the defendants sought to disqualify the
specially appointed judge pursuant to the disqualification statute. The
New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that once the Chief Justice appoints
a non-resident judge to hear the case, no party can disqualify the designated judge without cause. Because the disqualification statute "is limited to resident judges or those appointed by resident judges," 70 the court
concluded that the statute does not permit parties to disqualify non-resident judges appointed by the Chief Justice.
The decision is a welcome step in the process of narrowing the application of the judicial disqualification-without-cause statute. More is needed.
The statute should be repealed or declared unconstitutional. 7' An existing
constitutional mandate72 and ethical standards73 detailing when a judge
may be disqualified for cause provide adequate means of assuring that
unbiased judges will hear a case.
To prevent a party from "testing the waters" before exercising the right
to disqualify a judge without cause, the New Mexico Supreme Court has
ruled that a party who seeks a discretionary ruling from the assigned trial
judge may not thereafter disqualify the judge without cause. 74 In Smith
66. See, e.g., Romero v. Felter, 83 N.M. 736, 497 P.2d 738 (1972) (construing the statute to
permit each party, not each side, todisqualify one judge).
67. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978).
68. 96 N.M. 728, 634 P.2d 1280 (1981).
permits disqualification without proof of cause. Although the statute
the statute
69. In effect
requires an assertion thai the judge "cannot, according to the belief of the party making the affidavit,
preside over the action or proceeding with impartiality," the statute provides no means for challenging
the assertion. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978).
70. 96 N.M. at 729, 634 P.2d at 1281.
71. The disqualification statute arguably seeks to control a matter of procedure. So characterized,
the statute is either unconstitutional, or may be treated as a rule of court subject to judicial modification
or repeal. See, e.g., State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936); Ammerman v. Hubbard
Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 572 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 249, 572 P.2d
1257 (1977), U.S. cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
VI, § 18.
72. N.M. Const. art.
73. N.M. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
74. See, e.g., State ex rel. Howell v. Montoya, 74 N.M. 743, 398 P.2d 263 (1965); State ex rel.
Weltmer v. Taylor, 42 N.M. 405, 79 P.2d 937 (1938).
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v. Martinez,75 the supreme court clarified certain matters relating to this
waiver doctrine. Only the party who invites the court to rule on a discretionary matter is thereafter barred from exercising the statutory disqualification. 76 When the judge has exercised his discretion in a ruling
issued at the request of one party, the remaining parties may file a timely
affidavit of disqualification. 77 Moreover, if the judge has performed only
non-discretionary acts such as the mandatory appointment of counsel in
a juvenile case, 78 neither party is estopped from exercising-an otherwise
valid statutory disqualification. 7 9
PLEADINGS
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act requires that notice be given to or
received by the state within ninety days of the occurrence that is the
subject of a subsequent suit. 80 The statute provides that "no suit or action
• ..shall be maintained and no court shall have jurisdiction to consider
any suit" in which the notice requirement has not been met. 8'
In Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Commission, 2 the government asserted that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirement. The defendants raised the issue by filing a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court
dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff had not demonstrated compliance with the notice requirement. The court of appeals reversed. The
court held that "[p]rocedurally, it was defendants' burden to sustain their
defense that the notice requirements had not been met," 83 and concluded
that the defendants failed to establish non-compliance with the statutory
requirement.
The court erred in assigning to the defendants the burden of proof that
75. 96 N.M. 440, 631 P.2d 1308 (1981).
76. Id. at 442, 631 P.2d at 1310.
77. Id.
78. N.M. Stat. Ann. §32-1-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
79. 96 N.M. at 442, 631 P.2d at 1310.
80. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The statute requires that the claimant "shall
cause to be presented" a written notice of claim to the appropriate official within 90 days of the
occurrence. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The statute would bar litigation,
however, only if notice had not been given and the governmental entity did not have actual notice
of the occurrence. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). Thus, if the state receives
actual notice within 90 days of the occurrence, failure of the claimant to have complied with the
requirement of giving written notice will not bar the claim. Emery v. University of N.M. Medical
Center, 96 N.M. 144, 147, 628 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Ct. App. 1981); see Martinez v. City of Clovis,
95 N.M. 654, 625 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1980).
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
82. __ N.M. -_,652 P.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1981). [Ed. note: After this article was written, the
New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision, in New Mexico St. Highway
Comm'n v. Ferguson, N.M. -, 652 P.2d 230 (1982). The supreme court opinion will be
discussed in next year's Survey issue.]
83. N.M. at -, 652 P.2d at 742.
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the notice requirement was not met. Although failure to file suit within
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded
and proven by the defendant, 84 failure to comply with the statutory notice
requirement is not. The New Mexico Tort Claims Act explicitly provides
that failure to comply with the notice requirement constitutes a jurisdictional defect.8 5 New Mexico generally places the burden of proof of the
existence of jurisdiction upon the plaintiff when the defendant asserts that
jurisdiction does not exist. 8 6 The decision in Ferguson ignores this precedent. Placing the burden of proof that notice was not given or received
on the defendant may be simply one more indication of the judicial
tendency to construe the Tort Claims Act favorably to the persons suing
the state. 87 Nonetheless, the decision is contrary to the plain language of
the statute and probable intent of the legislature. Moreover, it saddles
governmental defendants with the difficult burden of seeking to establish
a negative proposition-that the government did not receive notice of the
claim within the time required by statute.
New Mexico's liberal pleading requirements8 8 and expansive rule permitting amendments to pleadings89 increase the likelihood that decisions
will be based upon the merits of a claim rather than upon the pleading
skills of the parties. Two cases decided this year limit the usefulness of
the amendment process to cure pleading errors. The decisions serve as
reminders that inartful pleadings may occasionally dictate the outcome
of litigation independent of the merits.
The New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure permit amendments to the
pleadings before, during, and after the trial. 90 Before trial is commenced,
9
leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so requires." There
are good reasons to limit the privilege to amend once the trial has begun.
The defendant must know the specific claims of the plaintiff so that the
84. N.M. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
86. Once the allegations ofjurisdictional facts are adequately traversed and challenged, the plaintiff
has the burden to prove the jurisdictional allegations. State ex rel. Anaya v. Columbia Research
Corp., 92 N.M. 104, 105, 583 P.2d 468,469 (1978). See also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) (if allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged, proponent must
support them by competent proof); Beary v. Norton-Simon, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(the burden of proving proper jurisdiction always rests upon the party asserting it).
87. See generally Note, Torts-Government Immunity Under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.
II N.M.L. Rev. 475 (1981).
88. "The function of pleadings under these rules is to give fair notice of the claim asserted so
as to enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial. [citation omitted]. [Flair notice of the
nature of the action will withstand a motion to dismiss .. " Las Luminarias of the N.M. Council
of the Blind v. Isengard, 92 N.M. 297, 304, 587 P.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 1978) (Sutin, J.,specially
concurring). See Malone v. Swift Fresh Meats Co., 91 N.M. 359, 362, 574 P.2d 283, 286 (1978).
89. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15.
90. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (b).
91. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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defendant can prepare an adequate defense. The court must be aware of
the plaintiff's specific claims so that it can anticipate and properly rule
on the myriad issues which arise during the course of the trial.92 Recognizing these needs, Rule 15(b) grants only limited authority to the trial
court to permit amendments during trial. If the defendant objects 93 to the
introduction of evidence at trial which is directed to issues outside the
scope of the pleadings, 94 the court "shall" permit amendment of the
pleading unless the defendant proves that the admission of such evidence
"would prejudice him in maintaining his ... defense upon the merits." 9 5
In determining whether prejudice would result, the court is to consider
whether the defendant's claim of surprise can be mooted by the grant of
a continuance so that the defendant can have time to prepare an adequate
defense to the new claim. 96
The preference for determination on the merits usually wins out over
the claim of prejudice. Most often, the court grants the request to amend
during trial .97 Camp v. Bernalillo County Medical Center" presents the
92. "One of the vital purposes ... of pre-trial conference is to acquaint ... the court with the
real issues of fact and law in a case so they may be intelligently informed as to what questions will
be for determination at a trial on the merits." Lockwood v. Hercules Powder Co., 7 F.R.D. 24. 28
(W.D. Mo. 1947).
93. If evidence is admitted without objection from a defendant who is aware of the resultant
expansion in the scope of the trial, the rule provides that the pleadings shall be deemed to have
been amended to conform to the evidence. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(b). See, e.g., Csanyi v. Csanyi, 82
N.M. 411, 412, 483 P.2d 292, 293 (1971); George v. Jensen, 49 N.M. 410, 413, 165 P.2d 129,
131 (1946).
94. The pleadings frame the issues for trial only in the absence of a pretrial order. Rule 16
authorizes the court to conduct a pretrial conference to formulate the issues for trial. It provides that
at the conclusion of the conference, the court shall make an order "which limits the issues for
trial ..
" N.M. R. Civ. P. 16(6). Once the pretrial order is entered, it "controls the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." Id. On its face, this
language is more restrictive of the court's power to permit amendments during trial than that contained
in Rule 15(b). The court may have less discretion to amend a pretrial order made pursuant to Rule
16 than it has to permit amendment of a plaintiff's complaint during a trial in which no pretrial
to prevent
conference was conducted. Compare N.M. R. Civ. P. 16(6) ("unless modified at the trial
manifest injustice") with N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (court shall permit amendments during trial "freely"
unless objecting party can demonstrate prejudice). See Case v. Abrams, 352 F.2d 193, 195 (10th
Cir. 1965) ("[u]nlike pleadings, usually based on information and belief, the pre-trial order defining
the issues is the result of discovery. . . . The issues having been thus defined, they ought to be
adhered to.... ").
95. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
96. Id.
97. Rule 15(b) "admonishes the court that amendments should be allowed freely whenever the
presentation of the case's merits will be subserved thereby." C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1495 (1971). If the objecting party demonstrates prejudice and surprise, a continuance is more appropriate than a denial of the amendment. Id. "[T]he court may and should permit
the pleadings to be freely amended in order to aid in the presentation of the merits of the controversy,
as long as the opposing party is not actually prejudiced." Kleeman v. Fogerson, 74 N.M. 688, 692,
397 P.2d 716, 718 (1965). "[T]he general tenor of the rule [is to] reach the merits of the controversy
and not determine the case on a mere technicality." Id.
98. 96 N.M. 611, 633 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1981).
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exceptional situation in which proof of incurable prejudice to the defendant overcame the court's preference for permitting amendments during the trial. In Camp, the plaintiff alleged malpractice in a complaint
asserting eight specific acts of negligence. Prior to commencement of the
non-jury trial, the trial judge explained that if the judge's neighbor was
to testify as a witness the judge would have to recuse himself. Both
parties assured the court that it would not be necessary to call the witness.
At the trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of an act of negligence which had not been pleaded in his complaint. The defendant
objected to the introduction of the evidence and to the proposal to amend
the complaint to encompass the new claim. The defendant noted that- if
the court permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence to support the new
claim, the defendant would be obligated to call as a defense witness the
judge's neighbor. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend the
pleadings at trial and then refused to permit the defendant to call the
neighbor as a rebuttal witness.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment for the plaintiff. The court
held that the trial judge should not have permitted the plaintiff to amend
the complaint once trial had begun. The grant of an amendment to the
plaintiff's complaint during trial combined with a ruling barring the defendant from calling a necessary rebuttal witness unduly prejudiced the
defendant. Reversal of the judgment and the grant of a new trial, presumably before a different judge, 99 permits the plaintiff to introduce his
new theory and to obtain a ruling on the merits, and permits the defendant
to present fully its defense to the claim.
To avoid similar problems, plaintiffs should amend their complaints
after discovery has been completed and prior to trial. If a pretrial conference is conducted, a plaintiff should there seek to amend his pleadings
to include every allegation which the discovery process has indicated is
capable of being proven. 100 Camp illustrates that the provision authorizing
amendments during trial is not always an adequate substitute for the
preferable practice of seeking pretrial amendments to the pleadings at the
close of discovery but before the commencement of trial.
If the applicable statute of limitations has run between the time the
original pleading was filed and the time an amendment is sought, the
question arises whether the amendment should "relate back" to the original pleading. Amendments which relate back are treated as having been
filed within the time period required by the statute. Rule 15(c) provides
99. If a different judge presides at the second trial, the defendant's rebuttal witness can testify
in opposition to the plaintiff's new assertion of negligence. See Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396,
589 P.2d 180 (1978) (recusal by trial judge following reversal on appeal and remand for new trial).
100. N.M. R. Civ. P. 16(2) provides that the trial court should consider "the necessity or desirabilty
of amendments to the pleadings" at the pretrial conference.
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that amendments which change the legal theory of recovery relate back
if the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the same
transactional setting as that contained in the original complaint.1o In
DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections,102 the

court of appeals misconstrued the rule in a manner which severely undercuts its liberal purpose.
In DeVargas, the plaintiff instituted an action against state employees
and the state seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983103 for alleged
violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights. After the statute of limitations had run,' °4 the plaintiff realized that the federal claim was not
available against the state itself.' °5 The plaintiff sought to amend his
complaint to assert a claim against the state under the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act. 0 6 Although the proposed amendment merely changed the
legal theory of recovery and undoubtedly arose from the same transaction
as was set forth in the original complaint, the court of appeals concluded
that the relation back rule was inapplicable and that the statute of limitations was a bar to recovery. The court of appeals declared that where
the original complaint asserts a claim based upon an inapplicable legal
theory, the original complaint is a "nullity" to which no amendments can
be made.' 07
101. "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading." N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
102. 97 N.M. 450, 640 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166
(1982). Recently, the court of appeals also went out of its way to strictly apply Rule 15(c) in order
to prevent an amendment after the statute of limitations had run. Raven v. Marsh, 94 N.M. 116,
607 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1980).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
103.
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain an explicit statute of limitations. The federal courts have
held that the applicable statute of limitations should be derived from the most closely analogous
state statute of limitations. E.g., Gipson v. Township of Bass River, 82 F.R.D. 122 (D.N.J. 1979).
In DeVargas, in an opinion entitled "Decision on Certiorari," the New Mexico Supreme Court stated
that the appropriate limitations period was the two year limitation for actions against the state
contained in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166. Compare Gunther v.
Miller, 498 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.M. 1980).
105. Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
187-92 (1961)). See Kovnat, Constitutional Torts and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 13 N.M.L.
Rev. 1, 42-44 (1983) (whether state as an entity is liable under § 1983 is an open question).
106. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
107. 97 N.M. at 452, 640 P.2d at 1329. The court of appeals cited Mercer v. Morgan, 86 N.M.
711, 526 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App. 1974), in support of its position. In Mercer, the court held that where
the initial action is brought against a person then dead it is "a nullity and of no legal effect." Id.
at 712, 526 P.2d at 1305. The Mercer court correctly held that the complaint could not be amended
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The decision would permit only complaints that contain a properly pled
cause of action to be amended after the statute of limitations has run,
even where the proposed amendment merely asserts a different legal basis

for recovery based upon the same facts as set out in the original pleading.
Neither the language of Rule 15(c) nor the policies sought to be furthered
by the Rule support the court of appeals' decision. The Rule itself does

not require that the initial pleading state a valid claim.'o 8 Defendants were
on notice prior to the running of the statute of limitations that they were
being sued and should prepare a defense. The conduct giving rise to the
suit was adequately described in the initial pleading; only the legal theory
was sought to be changed by amendment. Moreover, the decision imposes
a penalty on parties who plead with specificity.'°9 Had the plaintiff complied only with the minimum pleading requirements, he would not have
identified in the initial complaint the legal theory he relied upon. The
complaint would have been sufficient" 0 and there would have been no
need to even seek an amendment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Review of grants of summary judgments by trial court judges consumed
much of the time of the appellate courts."' One appellate judge thinks
that the time spent reviewing such decisions is wasted. Finding that grants
to name the personal representative as a defendant because that constituted the filing of a new law
suit against a different defendant. Such an amendment did not meet the special requirements set
forth in Rule 15(c) when a new party is sought to be brought into the action after the statute of
limitations has run. In contrast, in DeVargas, the initial complaint and the proposed amendment
charged the same defendant with different legal theories.
108. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(c). New Mexico courts have previously held that "the general wrong
suffered and the general conduct causing the wrong are the controlling considerations" of the relation
back rule. Scott v. Newsom, 74 N.M. 399, 405, 394 P.2d 253,-257 (1964). "The test of whether
an amended pleading relates back to the original pleading is whether a 'claim for relief' was made
or attempted within the statutory period." Brito v. Carpenter, 81 N.M. 716, 718, 472 P.2d 979,
981 (1970) (emphasis added).
109. New Mexico courts have been penalizing parties who plead specifically, a trend which is
unwise and counterproductive. E.g., Houston v. Young, 94 N.M. 308, 610 P.2d 195 (1980); See
Occhialino, Civil Procdure, Survey of New Mexico Law: 1980-81, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 97, 124-26
(1982).
110. N.M. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) does not require that the legal theory be identified.
11l.The New Mexico appellate courts decided forty-seven cases involving summary judgment
during the Survey year. The vast majority of these cases were appeals from trial court grants of
summary judgment. Denials of summary judgment motions are normally not immediately reviewable.
But see Gonzalez v. Whitaker, 97 N.M. 710, 643 P.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1982) (the defendant successfully
applied for interlocutory appeal on trial court denial of summary judgment and the denial was
affirmed); Boothe Financial Corp. v. Loretto Block, Inc., 97 N.M. 496, 641 P.2d 527 (Ct. App.
1982) (defendants granted an interlocutory appeal from a partial summary judgment granted to
plaintiff and the judgment was affirmed); Tompkins v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 96 N.M. 368, 630
P.2d 767 (Ct. App. 1981) (defendants' motion for summary judgment denied, interlocutory appeal
granted, and denial of summary judgment was affirmed).
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of summary judgment "are almost uniformly reversed""12 by appellate
courts, Judge Sutin has concluded that summary judgment practice leads
to such a "[w]aste of time, effort and expense in district courts and
appellate courts

. . ."
3 He

that the process has become a "cancer" in the

suggested that repeal of the rule authorizing sumjudicial process."
mary judgments may be appropriate.'"
Reform of summary judgment procedure might be necessary if abolition
of the device is not. Trial judges grant summary judgments when they
conclude that no material issue of fact is in dispute and that judgment
should issue as a matter of law. '" Necessarily, the trial judge who grants
summary judgment must have determined what the undisputed facts were,
what the applicable law is, and must have combined the two to reach the
result embodied in the summary judgment. Nonetheless, the trial judge
is not required to issue findings and conclusions when granting summary
judgment. 116 This is unfortunate for several reasons. First, the process of
drafting findings and conclusions provides an opportunity for the judge
to review and confirm the correctness of his decision to grant summary
112. Ruiz v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 97 N.M. 194, 204, 638 P.2d 406, 416 (Ct. App.) (Sutin,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 242, 638 P.2d 1087 (1981).
For further discussion of this case, see Otten & McBride, Torts, post at 473. But see Jelso v. World
Balloon Corp., 97 N.M 164, 637 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1981). which affirmed a grant of summary
judgment with Judge Sutin concurring in the result.
113. Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 96 N.M. 598, 602, 633 P.2d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 1981).
114. Id. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 56. On another occasion, however, Judge Sutin conceded that
"wisely used, summary judgment is a praiseworthy time-saving device." Ruiz v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 97 N.M. at 204, 638 P.2d at 416. It is true that in the majority of cases, appellate
courts reverse trial court decisions granting summary judgment. E.g.. Santistevan v. Centinel Bank
of Taos, 96 N.M. 730, 634 P.2d 1282 (1981); Ruiz v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 97 N.M. 194,
638 P.2d 405 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 242. 638 P.2d 1087 (1981); Security Bank & Trust
v. Parmer, 97 N.M. 108, 637 P.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1981); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sydow, 97 N.M.
51, 636 P.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1981); Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 96 N.M. 598, 633 P.2d 706 (Ct. App.
1981); Emery v. University of N.M. Medical Center, 96 N.M. 144, 628 P.2d 1140 (Ct. App. 1981);
EIS v. Chesnut, 96 N.M. 45, 627 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116. 628 P.2d 686
(1981); Sweenhart v. Co-Con, Inc., 95 N.M. 773, 626 P.2d 310 (Ct. App.). cert. denied, 95 N.M.
669, 625 P.2d 1186 (1981). But see Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 97 N.M. 164, 637 P.2d 846 (Ct.
App. 1981). This undoubtedly reflects the court's perspective that summary judgment is an "extreme
remedy . . . to be employed with great caution," so as not to impinge on the parties' right to a trial
on the merits of disputed issues of fact. Id. at 167, 637 P.2d at 849.
No data exist to demonstrate whether the reported appellate cases accurately reflect the relative
usefulness of summary judgment procedure. Although most reported opinions reverse trial court
grants of summary judgment, the appellate opinions may not accurately reflect the daily experiences
in the trial courts. It is possible that summary judgment procedures are being used efficiently to
weed out many cases not worthy of a trial on the merits and that most parties who suffer a summary
judgment conclude that the judgment was correct and choose not to appeal.
It would be useful to determine the number of unappealed grants of summary judgment in
comparison to the number of appealed decisions. Only with this information can the actual efficiency
of the summary judgment be determined.
115. N.M. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
116. N.M. R. Civ. P. 52(B)(1) provides that: "Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
unnecessary in decisions on motions under Rules 12, 50 or 56 [summary judgment rule] .... "
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judgment. "I7 In addition, findings would constitute an accurate record of
the facts that the judge found. This would facilitate subsequent determinations of the collateral estoppel or res judicata effect of the judgment. 8 Requiring findings and conclusions would also facilitate appellate
review of grants of summary judgment. 9 At least when one of the parties
requests it, the trial court judge should issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, even though he is not now required to do so.' 20
The ambiguities inherent in the standard used to determine summary
judgment motions make correct application of the device difficult. Summary judgment is granted only when no material issue of fact is in dispute
and only questions of law need resolution. ' 2' Often, the court must decide
whether sufficient evidence has been presented to raise a factual question.
On other occasions, no doubt exists as to the historical facts; instead, the
issue is whether the application of the undisputed facts to the controlling
law is a "mixed question of fact and law" and thus a question for the
jury or solely a legal question for the trial judge.
Determining whether an issue of historical fact has been raised is largely
idiosyncratic. An analysis of the quality of the specific evidence gathered
in the particular case is required. In such cases, appellate courts cannot
set useful general guidelines to assist district court judges in other cases.
This results in ad hoc resolution of this type of case by trial judges. The
absence of clear guidelines encourages a large number of appeals by
litigants convinced that the absence of clear standards of review will
permit appellate courts to indulge in their penchant for reversing trial
court grants of summary judgment.122 This type of summary judgment
case creates the most difficulties for lawyers, trial judges, and the appellate
bench.
In contrast, when the critical consideration is not whether an issue of
historical fact exists, but whether the judge or the jury should apply the
undisputed facts to the law, the precedential value of appellate opinions
increases. Illustrative of this type of appellate review of summary judgment is Jelso v. World Balloon Corp.' 23 In Jelso, the plaintiff sought
117. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751-52 (3d Cir. 1965).
118. See Mora v. Martinez, 80 N.M. 88, 89-90, 451 P.2d 992, 993-94 (1969).
119. See Ruiz v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 97 N.M. at 204, 638 P.2d at 416 (Sutin, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
120. Rule 52 does not bar the court from issuing findings and conclusions in summary judgment
proceedings. It merely states that they are "unnecessary." N.M. R. Civ. P. 52(B)(1). When the
losing party does not plan to appeal the grant of summary judgment and neither party foresees the
likelihood of res judicata or collateral estoppel ramifications, the parties may forego the request for
findings and conclusions.
121. N.M. R. Civ. P. 56(C).
122. See supra note I11.
123. 97 N.M. 164, 637 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1982).
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workmen's compensation benefits for an injury suffered in a ballooning
accident. The facts were undisputed.' 4 The fundamental question was
whether, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was an employee of the
defendant as required by the Workmen's Compensation Statute.' 2 5 The
trial court ruled that application of the law to the undisputed facts was a
legal question. The judge therefore resolved the issue himself by granting
a summary judgment to the defendant because he found that the plaintiff
was not an employee.
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. It concluded that "[t]he material facts before the court were not in dispute,26
only the determination of the legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom. "
Because the undisputed facts were "susceptible of but one logical inference, it becomes a conclusion of law as to whether the status of an
employer-employee relationship exists. "' 27 Summary judgment is appropriate in such cases. Jelso signals to trial court judges that the determination of whether a person is an employee may be resolved by summary
judgment "[wihere the facts before the court are not in dispute but only
the legal effect of the facts" is in issue.128
In contrast, the court of appeals twice held that the issue of whether
a plaintiff's contributory negligence was a proximate cause of his injury
was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment, even when the
historical facts were not in dispute. In Sweenhart v. Co-Con, Inc.,'29 the
court of appeals concluded that the undisputed facts demonstrated that
the plaintiff's decedent had been guilty of contributory negligence. Nonetheless, summary judgment was improper because the issue of whether
the contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the accident could
not be resolved conclusively from the affidavits presented in support of
the motion. 310 In Ruiz v. Southern Pacific TransportationCo., '3' the court
also reversed a summary judgment for the same reason. Although the
124. "The facts as set forth in plaintiff's affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment and as set out in the plaintiff's brief in chief are essentially undisputed." Id. at 165, 637
P.2d at 847.
125. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-28 (1978). Technically, the issue was whether the plaintiff was a
"workman." Id. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-16 (Cum. Supp. 1982), which defines "workman."
126. 97 N.M. at 167, 637 P.2d at 849.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 95 N.M. 773, 626 P.2d 310 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186 (1981).
130. 95 N.M. at 775, 626 P.2d at 312. Earlier decisions have held that to be awarded summary
judgment, the movant must show not only contributory negligence but that such negligence was a
proximate contributing cause of harm. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Randel, 88 N.M. 629, 545 P.2d 95
(Ct. App. 1975) (boy riding a unicycle involved in an accident with a motor vehicle); Fitzgerald v.
Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 427 P.2d 655 (1967) (defendant struck the rear of an automobile on a dark
night and the struck automobile did not have lights on).
131. 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 242, 638 P.2d 1087 (1981).
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court suggested that no historical facts were in dispute, 132 summary judgment was determined to be inappropriate because the issue of whether

the conceded contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the ac'
cident "must be decided by the jury." 133
The decisions in Jelso, Sweenhart, and Ruiz have value as precedent
and may aid trial courts confronted with summary judgment motions in
cases involving similar issues.' 34 In contrast, where the controlling question is whether an issue of historical fact has been raised, trial courts will
continue to resolve the issue with little guidance except for the appellate

courts' obvious reluctance to affirm summary judgments.
Rule 56 provides that motions for summary judgment "shall be served

at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing."' 13 5 In 1980, the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the time requirement was mandatory; if ten days notice is not given, the trial court lacks the power to
award summary judgment. 31 6 This year the supreme court ruled differently.
In Santistevan v. Centinel Bank of Taos,'37 the defendant made a motion
to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint because the plaintiff was not the real
party in interest. On the date of the hearing, the defendant introduced

testimony contained in the plaintiff's deposition in support of the motion.
This transformed the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 38 The plaintiff neither objected to the introduction of the deposition
nor sought a postponement of the hearing. 3 9 The trial court granted the
motion. The plaintiff argued on appeal that the motion should not have
132. The court gave as its reason for refusing to affirm the grant of summary judgment that "the
question of causation exits . . . and that question must be decided by the jury." 97 N.M. at 199,
638 P.2d at 411. The court also suggested, however, that the fact pattern "parallels almost identically"
the facts of another case in which the court held alternatively that both the question of contributory
negligence and the issue of proximate cause necessarily raised factual questions. Id. at 198, 638
P.2d at 410 (citing Stratton v. Southern Ry., 190 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1951)).
133. 97 N.M. at 199, 638 P.2d at 411.
134. Of course, future litigation concerning contributory negligence will be resolved in accordance
with the doctrine of comparative negligence, judicially adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court
for trials commencing after February 12, 198 1. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
Because New Mexico has adopted pure comparative negligence, defendants will never be able to
obtain a summary judgment upon a showing of contributory negligence even if they could establish
proximate cause as a matter of law. Plaintiffs are entitled to some recovery even when their own
negligence causally contributes to the accident together with that of the defendant. Id.
135. N.M. R. Civ. P. 56(C).
136. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sutherland, 94 N.M. 653, 615 P.2d 268 (1980).
137. 96 N.M. 730, 634 P.2d 1282 (1981).
138. N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b). See Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Kirby Cattle Co.,
89 N.M. 169, 548 P.2d 449 (1976).
139. The summary judgment motion was set to be heard on the morning set for the commencement
of trial. 96 N.M. at 731, 634 P.2d at 1283. In such cases, there are obvious practical reasons for
not seeking a postponement of the motion and thus the trial in order to prepare a rebuttal to the
summary judgment motion. Moreover, presumably, the party opposing the summary judgment motion
has completed discovery by this time and should be prepared to introduce evidence on the day of
trial demonstrating that a factual issue exists.
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been granted because he was not given the required ten days notice of
the request for summary judgment. The supreme court disagreed. The
court held that the ten day notice provision was not a jurisdictional requirement. It can be waived where the opponent of the motion does not
object and actively participates in the hearing.' 4 0 Even when the opponent
of the motion lodges the objection, the court may nonetheless proceed4
unless the objecting party can demonstrate that prejudice will result.' 1
The decision in Santistevan is consistent with the obvious intent of the
rules. Rule 56 (f) provides a mechanism for requesting a delay in the
hearing of a motion for summary judgment whenever additional time is
required to prepare a defense to the motion. 142 This provision sufficiently
assures that the opponent of the summary judgment motion will have an
adequate opportunity to fully respond to the motion for summary judgment. Thus, there is no need to turn the ten-day requirement into a
mandatory time limit in all cases.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In New Mexico, jury instructions must follow the language of the
uniform jury instructions 4 1 whenever a uniform instruction is on point
and is not clearly erroneous. 14 4 One purpose and effect of this rule is to
reduce the frequency with which the accuracy of instructions becomes
an issue on appeal. 45 When the instruction given diverges only slightly
from the uniform instruction, it would be an exaltation of form over
substance to require a reversal of the trial decision without inquiring
whether the discrepancy may have had an impact on the decision. In
Lewis v. Bloom, 146 the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to overturn
a decision of a trial court which failed to instruct in the exact words of
an applicable uniform instruction. The court held that so long as the
instruction given "substantially complied" with the requirement that uniform instructions be used, there would be no reversal unless the proponent
of a literal reading of the uniform instruction could demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by the modification in the language.
Where no uniform instruction exists, the parties must fashion proposed
"41

140. Id. at 732, 634 P.2d at 1284.

141. Id.
142. N.M. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
143. The New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions for civil cases were adopted on May 5. 1966.
Order Approving Use of Uniform Jury Instructions, New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil
(contained in New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Judicial Volume 2).
144. N.M. R. Civ. P. 51(D) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
145. See Introduction, New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil, at 5 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
146. 96 N.M. 63, 628 P.2d 308 (1981).
147. Id. at 65, 628 P.2d at 310. The supreme court had earlier decided that failure to give a
mandatory uniform jury instruction did not constitute reversible error in the absence of a showing
of prejudice. Jewell v. Seidenberg, 82 N.M. 120, 477 P.2d 296 (1970).
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instructions. For example, the supreme court has yet to approve new
uniform jury instructions which reflect the recent judicial adoption of
comparative negligence. 48 Until the court approves uniform instructions,
counsel and judges will have to formulate appropriate instructions on a
case-by-case basis. The need to modify existing instructions'4 9 and to
draft new ones for comparative negligence cases will increase the likelihood that prejudicial error will occur until the supreme court adopts
such instructions. In the interim, appellate courts must determine whether
ad hoc instructions on comparative negligence are adequately drafted to
survive a challenge on appeal. The court of appeals has indicated that it
would tolerate some minor errors while courts and litigants struggle to
draft instructions dealing with'comparative negligence. In Armstrong v.
Industrial Electrical & Equipment Service, 50 the court concluded that
failure to include optional language from an existing uniform instruction
was not reversible error even though, in comparative negligence cases,
the trial court should henceforth include in the instruction the heretofore
optional language. The court relied on the oft-repeated rule that so long
as "all of the instructions, when read and considered together, fairly
present the issues and the law," it is not per se reversible error to have
erred in the formulation of a particular instruction. ' In such cases, the
complaining party must establish that prejudice resulted from the failure
to give a particular instruction.
The adoption of comparative negligence also has had an impact upon
the form of verdict used in negligence actions. The supreme court ruled
that special verdicts or special interrogatories are required in comparative
negligence cases. 52 Rule 49 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure
did not authorize the use of true special verdicts. The Rule required that
in all cases a general verdict be employed, although in addition to the
general verdict, the court could direct the jury to return special findings
of fact. Judges and lawyers preparing verdict forms in comparative negligence cases were required to insert a general verdict form with the
special interrogatories required by the supreme court. Failure to do so
constituted reversible error in most cases. 53 Effective July 1, 1982, Rule
148. The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence on February 12, 1981,
in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
149. Armstrong v. Industrial Elec. and Equip. Serv., 97 N.M. 272, 639 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1981)
(the existing uniform instruction dealing with proximate cause, N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 3.8, should be
modified in light of the adoption of comparative negligence).
150. 97 N.M. 272, 639 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1981).' For further discussion of this case see Otten
& McBride, Torts, post at 473.
151. 97 N.M. at 275, 639 P.2d at 84; see, e.g., Webb v. Webb, 87 N.M. 353, 533 P.2d 586
(1975); Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967).
152. N.M. Sup. Ct. Order No. 8000, Misc. (Mar. 30, 1981).
153. Dessauer v. Memorial Gen. Hosp., 96 N.M. 92, 95, 628 P.2d 337, 340 (Ct. App. 1981):
If a jury finds on special questions of fact in answer to interrogatories, without
a general verdict, the finding is of no force, and the court cannot give to the
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49 has been amended to authorize the use of true special verdicts in the
discretion of the trial court judge.' 54
A party who appeals on the ground that the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury must have preserved the issue by properly objecting
to the proposed instruction at the trial.' 55 The party should "tender a
correct instruction and alert the mind of the trial court to the fact that the
tendered instruction corrects the defect complained of. .. "."56Alternatively it is sufficient "to point out the specific vice in the instruction
given by proper objection." 57 In Budagherv. Amrep Corp., 5 8the supreme
court liberally construed the latter requirement to prevent a finding of
waiver. At issue was the correctness of an instruction detailing the duty
owed to third persons by a landowner who hires another to perform work
on his premises. Instead of tendering an alternative to the court's proposed
instruction, the plaintiff merely asserted that it was "inconsistent with
the duty of a landowner."' 59 The supreme court held that this language
satisfied the requirement that the objection point out specifically the error
in the proposed instruction. The court found that the tendered objection
"is not a mere assertion that the given instruction is not the law, but
rather it specifically states the vice complained of.""6 The court cannot
be counted upon always to be so liberal in its interpretation of the "specific
objection" requirement. 6' Lawyers should prepare and present alternative
instructions instead of relying upon the appellate courts' largess in determining when an objection unaccompanied by an alternative proposed
instruction is specific enough to preserve the right to appeal.
APPEALS
One reason that the rules
and claims 162 is to increase
the increased efficiency at
appellate process. Rule 54,

of procedure permit liberal joinder of parties
the efficiency of litigation. t63 Unfortunately,
the trial level has not been matched in the
which determines the appealablity of orders

special finding any weight unless they are sufficiently numerous and explicit
to leave nothing for the court to do but to determine questions of law.
154. "The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written
finding upon each issue of fact." N.M. R. Civ. P. 49 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
155. N.M. R. Civ. P. 51(I) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
156. Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 97 N.M. 116, 119, 637 P.2d 547, 550 (1981). For further
discussion of this case, see Otten & McBride, Torts, post at 473.
157. 97 N.M. at 119, 637 P.2d at 550.
158. 97 N.M. 116, 637 P.2d 547 (1981).
159. Id. at 119, 637 P.2d at 550.
160. Id.
161. E.g., Echols v. N.C. Ribble Co., 85 N.M. 240, 511 P.2d 566 (1973) ("[o]bjections must
be explicit. Objections in general terms are not sufficient.").
162. N.M. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
163. Prager v. Prager, 80 N.M. 773, 776, 461 P.2d 906, 909 (1969).
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that terminate fewer than all of the claims in complex litigation,' 64 can
be confusing. This year, the court of appeals took pity upon parties
enmeshed in complex litigation who sought review on appeal without
technical compliance with Rule 54. In two cases the court determined
that because the parties failed to comply with the requirements of Rule
54, the appeals were not properly before the court. Nonetheless, in each
case, the court decided to accept the appeal and decide the issues presented.
In Montoya v. Anaconda Mining Co., 165 the court of appeals considered
a case in which an inordinate amount of procedural maneuvering had
occurred by the time the case reached the appellate court. 166 The plaintiff
sought review of a trial court decision dismissing without prejudice one
of several claims he asserted against the defendant. The appeal was67
untimely, both because a dismissal without prejudice is not a final order, 1
and because the trial court had not released the issue for immediate review
in accordance with the requirements of Rule 54.'61 Undeterred, the court
of appeals chose to decide the appeal
"in order to avoid further appeals
69
arising out of the same issues." 1
In North v. Public Service Co., 70 the plaintiff sought both compensatory
and punitive damages for an alleged trespass. Eventually,"'7 the trial court
dismissed one count seeking punitive damages. The plaintiff sought to
appeal this final determination of one of his claims without obtaining the
necessary order from the district court judge pursuant to Rule 54. As in
Montoya, the court of appeals conceded that the issue was not properly
164. Complex litigation is used here to denominate any action in which more than one claim for
relief is permitted, or more than two parties are involved. The entry of judgment in these cases is
covered by N.M. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
165. 97 N.M. 1, 635 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 1981).
166. The plaintiff filed a workmen's compensation suit. The defendant moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment. The plaintiff filed notice of appeal.
Pending this first appeal, the plaintiff moved for leave to amend and to rehear the summary judgment
issue. The defendant moved to strike the amendment and first appeal. The plaintiff moved to dismiss
voluntarily his first appeal. The trial court conducted a hearing of the remaining issues. The trial
court entered a judgment without prejudice. The plaintiff filed a second appeal. The plaintiff then
sought a hearing on the amended complaint, but failed to appear at the hearing. The trial court
dismissed the first amended complaint with prejudice and the plaintiff filed a third appeal. Id. at 2,
3, 635 P.2d at 1324, 1325.
167. Ortega v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 91 N.M. 31, 569 P.2d 957 (Ct. App. 1977).
168. N.M. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1) requires that the court make an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay in order that a decision on fewer than all of the claims be considered a
final judgment for purposes of appeal. In Montoya, the court made no express determination.
169. 97 N.M. at 4, 635 P.2d at 1326.
170. 97 N.M. 406, 640 P.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1982).
171. In North, the plaintiff's trespass action was consolidated with the defendant's inverse condemnation action. The court dismissed the plaintiff's case for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff
successfully appealed. North v. Public Serv. Co., 94 N.M. 246, 608 P.2d 1128 (Ct. App. 1980).
After remand, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The plaintiff appealed. 97 N.M. at 407, 640 P.2d at 513.
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before the appellate court but determined the merits anyway, "[i]n the
interest of judicial economy and to avoid further appeals arising out of
the same issues." 172
The court demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the plight of litigants
who fail to comply with the requirements for appealing pursuant to Rule
54. Unfortunately, the court's solution is of doubtful validity. The court
of appeals may exercise appellate jurisdiction only as "may be provided
by law"' 73 and "in the manner prescribed for appeals to the supreme
court.' 1 74 If a party seeks to appeal a non-final order and no statute or
rule of court authorizes immediate review, the court must dismiss the
appeal. Once the court concluded in Montoya and North that the requirements for appellate jurisdiction were not met, the court should not have
decided the merits of the appeal. Advisory opinions are not authorized
in New Mexico, 75 and the court of appeals lacks power to take appeals
solely to provide guidance to lower courts under the guise of exercising
a superintending control. 176 The court lacks authority to create a common
law exception to the rules and statutes governing its appellate jurisdiction.
The court's desire to resolve the issues presented in the appeals is
understandable. The parties had already expended much time and effort
without significantly advancing the cases toward a decision on the merits.
Nonetheless, the court should not have ignored the thrust of Rule 54
which delegates responsibility to the district court to decide whether
decisions concerning portions of complex litigation should be immediately
appealable. The effect of the rulings is to encourage parties to appeal
without a jurisdictional basis for doing so in the hope that the court will
ignore the jurisdictional defect "in the interest of justice." If the court
of appeals believes that the failure of the parties to obtain an order
complying with Rule 54 is an oversight, a remedy is available. The court
can treat the appeal as prematurely filed, 77 hold it in abeyance, and direct
the appellant to seek a modification of the decision from the trial court
judge. If the judge brings the decision into compliance with the requirement of Rule 54, the appeal can proceed. If the judge declines to do so,
the appeal should be dismissed.
Statutes authorize the award of attorneys' fees in some cases. 78 Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court set forth guidelines for determining the amount of the awards and imposed procedural rules for the
172. 97 N.M. at 407, 640 P.2d at 513.
173. N.M. Const. art. V1, § 29.
174. N.M. Stat. Ann. §34-5-9 (1978).
175. State v. Herrod, 84 N.M. 418, 420, 504 P.2d 26, 28 (Ct. App. 1972).
176. The New Mexico Constitution grants the state supreme court the power to issue writs of
superintending control. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3. No similar power is given to the court of appeals.
177. See Weiss v. Hanes Mfg., 90 N.M. 683, 568 P.2d 209 (Ct. App. 1977).
178. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-12-16(B), 36-2-39, 40-5-15, 45-3-720, 58-15-20 (1978).
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trial court to follow when considering the question.' 79 There must be
evidentiary support in the record for the award and the trial court is to
draft findings and conclusions justifying its decision. 8 ° In this way appellate courts can effectively review the appropriateness of the award. If
the trial record is inadequate to support the award made, the appellate
court may remand the case to the district court with directions to make
the findings and conclusions necessary for effective review. 18' In Tafoya
' the court of appeals chose not to remand where
v. S & S Plumbing Co., 82
the party challenging the amount of the award failed to submit proposed
findings and conclusions on the issue to the district court judge. Instead,
the court held that the objecting party waived his right to attack the award
on appeal.' 83
Courts have had more difficulty setting the ground rules for determining
the amount of the award of attorneys' fees for representation in appellate
courts. The supreme court has held that an appellate court may itself
award attorneys' fees for appellate work, or it may remand the issue to
the trial court for determination.' 84 Confusion resulted in a recent case
when the supreme court failed to state which option it chose. In Vinton
' the supreme court affirmed a trial
Eppsco, Inc. v. Showe Homes, Inc., 85
court judgment in a case in which appellate attorneys' fees were authorized. The supreme court's opinion did not mention attorneys' fees. The
mandate to the district court called for "further proceedings, if any,
consistent with" the opinion.' 8 6 The district court interpreted this as an
authorization to award attorneys' fees for the appellate work and made
an award. The supreme court reversed. The court declared that its silence
on the issue of attorneys' fees constituted a rejection of the request for
an award of fees. Only if the mandate affirmatively orders the trial court
to award appellate attorneys' fees may the court do so.
179. Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979). In Fryar, the supreme court ruled
that the trial court's award of fees was not supported by the record and the court of appeals' award
for appellate work was excessive. The supreme court remanded to the trial court to determine the
amount of the award for the attorneys' efforts at trial and the supreme court reduced the appellate
fee. On appeal after remand, the court of appeals determined that the trial court's award of attorneys'
fees was excessive. Johnsen v. Fryar, 96 N.M. 323, 630 P.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed,
96 N.M. 543, 632 P.2d 1181 (1981). For further discussion of these cases, see Kelly, Workmen's
Compensation, post at 495 [hereinafter cited as Kelly].
180. 93 N.M. at 488, 601 P.2d at 721.
181. Id.
182. 97 N.M. 249, 638 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1981). For further discussion of this case, see Kelly,
supra note 179, at 495.
183. 97 N.M. at 251, 638 P.2d at 1096.
184. Vinton Eppsco, Inc. v. Showe Homes, Inc., 97 N.M. 225, 638 P.2d 1070 (1981).
185. Id.
186. Id.at 226, 638 P.2d at 1071. See N.M. R. Civ. App. 20 regarding mandates from New
Mexico appellate courts.
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In Tafoya v. S & S Plumbing Co.," the court of appeals ruled that
when appellate courts award attorneys' fees for appellate work, they need
not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate amount of
the award. The court also suggested that the record need not contain
specific evidentiary support for the award. Instead, "judicial notice" of
the effort involved in research and brief writing may be considered together with knowledge of the amount of time expended in oral argument. 88
Appellate courts should not be free to avoid the duty placed on district
courts to articulate the reasoning leading to the determination of attorneys'
fees and to have evidentiary support in the record to justify the award.
While evidentiary hearings need not be compulsory in either appellate or
trial courts, appellate courts should address the issue directly and explain
their reasoning.' 89 This would help to assure that the appellate court fully
considered the issue and properly applied the correct criteria for determining the amount of the award. It would also create a body of precedent
which would tend to assure uniformity among the courts and permit
litigants to assess, as part of their litigation planning, the likelihood that
an award of attorneys' fees will be made. Moreover, when the court of
appeals awards attorneys' fees, a full explanation of the rationale is necessary to assure effective review of the award by the New Mexico Supreme
Court.
Appellate court judges are in the best position to determine whether
to award appellate attorneys' fees and to set the amount. "9If the burden
of doing so is too great for the appellate courts, they should explicitly
delegate the responsibility to the trial court as part of the appellate court's
mandate to the district court.'91
REOPENING JUDGMENTS

New Mexico courts continue to struggle with the question of when to
permit final judgments to be reopened after the time for appeal has expired.
Resolution of the issue often depends upon the circumstances presented
in each case rather than on a clearly stated and uniformly applied set of
187. 97 N.M. 249, 638 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1981).
188. Id. at 252, 638 P.2d at 1097. In addition, "[a]ppellate courts can examine the briefs and
take note of the degree of difficulty of the issues involved. They can consider other factors that
indicate the amount of time expended by counsel in perfecting an appeal that do not require evidentiary
hearings." Id.
did not require a hearing, but only 'proceedings.'
189. "The supreme court opinion in Fryar ....
All that is required is that there be 'evidentiary support,' which can mean facts presented during or
after trial." Id. Thus, attorneys' affidavits accompanied by time sheets could be introduced as
evidentiaty support for the award of fees.
190. See, e.g., Tafoya v. S & S Plumbing Co., 97 N.M. 249, 638 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1981).
191. See Vinton Eppsco, Inc. v. Showe Homes, Inc. 97 N.M. at 226, 638 P.2d at 1071.
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standards. In two of the three cases decided this year, courts permitted
late attacks on completed lawsuits. In the other case, the court rejected
a request by a litigant who sought reconsideration of a once-litigated
question.
In State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Perlman, 192 the court
of appeals justifiably permitted an earlier decision to be reopened. In
1978, the state charged a mother with neglect. The mother received notice
of the proceeding, but was not informed of her right to a lawyer as
required by the applicable statutory provision'93 and rule of court.' 94 The
court adjudged the child to be neglected. Two years later, the Department
of Human Services returned to court and sought permanent termination
of the mother's parental rights. As part of its case for permanent termination, the Department sought to establish that the mother had been guilty
of neglect in the past.' 95 The mother argued that the prior determination
of neglect was void because the trial judge had failed to inform her of
her right to an attorney. The court rejected the challenge to the validity
of the initial decree. The court of appeals reversed. It concluded that
failure to inform the mother of her right to counsel in the 1978 proceeding
constituted a violation of due process sufficient to void the proceeding.
The mother could raise the issue in the subsequent termination proceeding, 196 despite the fact that she did not appeal the earlier adjudication
of neglect. The decision is a good one. When a litigant is effectively
deprived of a guaranteed right to counsel, she cannot be faulted for failing
to appeal or raise defenses in the proceeding in which she was unrepresented. It is sound procedure to permit a subsequent attack when counsel
finally is appointed.
Less defensible is the decision in Mechem v. City of Santa Fe. 1 In
192. 96 N.M. 779, 635 P.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1981).
193. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97 (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31 (Repl. Pamp. 1981)).
194. N.M. R. Child. Ct. P. 15. The current version of this rule is at N.M. R. Child. Ct. P. 55
(Repl. Pamp. 1982).
195. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-4 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The statute actually requires that the
child "is a neglected or abused child." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-7-4(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (emphasis
added). The court's resolution of the case made it unnecessary to address the issue of whether a
prior finding of neglect could support a finding that the child "is" neglected. The court of appeals,
by voting that "none of the findings indicate that a new or current finding of neglect was considered,
requested, or made," suggests that proof of former neglect, alone, may not be sufficient. 96 N.M.
at 782, 635 P.2d at 591.
196. It is unclear from the opinon whether the proceedings to terminate the mother's parental
rights was a completely separate lawsuit from the neglect proceeding brought two years earlier. The
court of appeals noted that the petition to terminate was " 'ancillary' to the neglect proceeding,"
but did not otherwise explain the relationship between the two claims. 96 N.M. at 782, 635 P.2d
at 591. The vagueness of the relationship may account for the court's failure to apply N.M. R. Civ.
P. 60(b) expressly to the determination of the issue.
197. 96 N.M. 668, 634 P.2d 690 (1981). In Mechem, the initial decisions were rendered by a
zoning commission and not by a court. Rule 60(b) permits relief from "a final judgment, order, or
proceeding .... "N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b). It is unclear whether the actions of the zoning commission
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Mechem, the supreme court permitted a property owner to attack collaterally a twelve-year-old decision of a zoning authority. In 1967, the zoning
authority granted the property owner a special exception to the zoning
code, ' but conditioned the exception upon the continued ownership of
the land by the applicant. The owner accepted the decision and did not
appeal. In 1976, 1977, and 1978, the property owner requested that the
zoning authority remove the condition. Each time, the zoning authority
declined to do so. Each time, the property owner failed to appeal. Instead,
in 1979, the property owner filed a lawsuit in district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that the zoning authority
lacked power to attach the condition to the grant of the special exception.
The trial court dismissed the suit. The supreme court reversed. The
court concluded that when a zoning authority acts in excess of its powers,
an interested person can attack collaterally the decision of the zoning
authority. Failure of the claimant to appeal at the time of the initial decision
was not a bar to collateral attack. Apparently, it is not even necessary
that the party first ask the zoning authority to correct its error before
instituting a collateral attack in court.
The ruling is unfortunate. Under it, no decision of a zoning authority
can be said to be final. Whenever one seeks to declare the action of a
zoning authority to be void because in excess of its authority, the challenger may do so. Only the vaguely defined doctrine of laches can prevent
long delayed attacks on zoning decisions.'99 The supreme court should
have insisted that the property owner appeal the zoning decision when it
was rendered. 2° To permit a party to accept the benefits of a decision for
twelve years and then to attack the validity of the decree undercuts the
goal of repose. No legitimate reason exists for permitting the long-delayed
attack on the zoning decision.20 '
constitute a "proceeding" within the contemplation of Rule 60. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-21-8 (Cum.
Supp. 1982) ("appeals to zoning authority; grounds: stay of proceedings") (emphasis added). For
further discussions of this case, see Minzner, Property, post at 435, and Shapiro & Jacobvitz,
Administrative Law, ante at 235.
198. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-21-8 (Cum. Supp. 1982), authorizes the local zoning authority to permit

special exceptions to the zoning code.
199. The court conceded that the doctrine of laches could bar a subsequent attack on the unappealed
decisions of a zoning authority. 96 N.M. at 671, 634 P.2d at 693. The court found that laches was
inapplicable on the facts presented because the defendant city was not prejudiced by the owner's
delay in challenging the decisions of the zoning authority. Id.
200. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-21-9(A) (1978), provides that any party "aggrieved by a decisiQn of
the zoning authority" may seek relief from the district court. The statute requires that "the petition
" The decision
shall be presented to the court within thirty days after the decision is entered ..
in Mechem completely undercuts this statutory time requirement for seeking review.
201. The supreme court determined that the zoning authority lacked power to attach conditions
to the grant of a special exception. 96 N.M. at 673, 634 P.2d at 695. The court held that an action
of the authority beyond its powers made the action "void" and concluded that "lc]ollateral attack
is permitted to challenge an administrative determination which is void because it was made without
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The supreme court's inconsistency in this area is highlighted by contrasting Mechem with the result reached in Gideon v. Gideon.2"2 In Gideon,
the trial court held a hearing to determine whether a father was in contempt
of court for failure to turn over custody of a child to the mother pursuant
to the terms of a stipulated agreement which was incorporated into a
divorce decree. The father did not appear at the hearing. His attorney
introduced on his behalf an affidavit seeking to repudiate the validity of
the stipulated agreement. The court held the father in contempt and set
a daily fine of $500 for non-compliance. Some months later, the father
sought to reopen the contempt ruling pursuant to Rule 60. He asserted
that the court erred in its determination that he had agreed to the stipulated
settlement. The trial court refused to reopen the decision. The supreme
court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The court noted that the
father failed to appeal the original decision and that the Rule 60 motion
"raises nothing new, but merely reasserts a contention which was pre20 3
viously found against him . . . and from which he did not appeal.
It is difficult to justify the different results in Mechem and Gideon. In
both cases, litigants who participated in earlier proceedings failed to
appeal the initial determination. In each case, the party sought to raise
issues by collateral attack which could have been raised on direct appeal.
Yet in Mechem, the court permitted reopening the judgment, while in
Gideon, in words equally appropriate to Mechem, the court declared that
the applicant for relief from the judgment "shall not be heard to complain
now of rulings which he found it convenient for so long to simply ig2
nore." 04
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel define the preclusive impact of completed litigation on subsequently filed, separate law205
suits. If onl a single lawsuit is involved, neither doctrine is applicable.
The doctrine of law of the case2 0 6 determines the extent to which decisions
express or implied statutory power." 96 N.M. at 670, 634 P.2d at 692. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)
(permits reopening of judgment when judgment is void).
202. 96 N.M. 315, 630 P.2d 267 (1981).
203. 96 N.M. at 317, 630 P.2d at 269.
204. Id.
205. "[Tihe doctrine of 'law of the case' applies only to the one case ... while res judicata
forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case." Carroll v. Bunt,
50 N.M. 127, 131, 172 P.2d 116, 118 (1946).
206. Most often, the law of the case doctrine is applied in situations in which there has been an
appeal, a remand of the case for retrial and a second appeal. "It is unquestionably the generally
accepted doctrine that the law applied on the first appeal of a case is binding on the second appeal.
This doctrine, 'the law of the case,' has been many times applied in this jurisdiction." Farmers State
Bank v. Clayton Nat'l Bank, 31 N.M. 344, 353, 245 P. 543, 547 (1926).
In addition, where decisions rendered in the course of a first trial were not then objected to, those
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rendered earlier in the proceeding are binding at subsequent stages of the
same lawsuit.
In State v. Cottonbelt Insurance Co., 2 °7 the supreme court applied the
res judicata doctrine only when a single lawsuit was involved. Although
the court reached the correct result, its application of res judicata to a
situation where the doctrine was inapplicable was unnecessary and unwise. In Cottonbelt, the insurance company posted an appearance bond
on behalf of a defendant in a criminal case. The defendant appeared at
the trial, but failed to surrender himself to serve the sentence imposed
by the court. The trial court ordered the bond forfeited. The company
raised certain defenses to the forfeiture," 8 which the trial court rejected.
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of forfeiture and issued a mandate offering the district court to conduct "such further proceedings as
may be proper."2 °9 By this time the state had captured the convicted
criminal. The company returned to the district court and asked the court
to remit the amount of the bond less only the state's expenses in capturing
the convicted felon. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that
the issue of the forfeiture of the bond had already been litigated. The
supreme court reversed. The court concluded that the doctrine of res
judicata was controlling. It decided that where there was a change of
circumstances between the time of the first and second proceedings, res
judicata should not be applied to bar reconsideration of the issue initially
decided.2" ' Apprehension of the convicted felon after the district court
decisions are binding in a second trial following a successful appeal and remand, because the
unappealed ruling "became the law of the case...." Johnson v. Citizen's Casualty Co., 63 N.M.
460, 464, 321 P.2d 640, 643 (1955).
Finally, "law of the case," has been used to justify the refusal to consider on direct appeal, trial
court determinations to which no exception was taken. E.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n
v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 76 N.M. 587, 590, 417 P.2d 68, 71 (1966).
207. 97 N.M. 152, 637 P.2d 834 (1981).
208. Cottonbelt argued that the surety bond was conditioned only upon the appearance of the
defendant at all court proceedings, and that the bond did not cover his failure to surrender to serve
the sentence. Id. at 153, 637 P.2d at 835.
209. Id.
210. New Mexico precedent authorizes the court to make an exception to the dictates of the
doctrine of res judicata when there has been a "change of circumstances" in the interim between
the first and second lawsuit. Williams v. Butler, 76 N.M. 782, 418 P.2d 856 (1966); Mershon v.
Neff, 67 N.M. 311, 355 P.2d 128 (1960). These cases involved the question of whether an earlier
decision refusing to lift restrictive covenants imposed in certain deeds was binding in a subsequent
suit seeking to remove the restrictive covenants. The applicable substantive law authorizes relief
where there has been a substantial change in the conditions of the surrounding land which make
continued enforcement of the restrictive covenants unnecessary. See Neff v. Hendricks, 57 N.M.
440, 443-44, 259 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (1953). The very nature of the substantive issue, dependent
as it is on changing circumstances of the surrounding neighborhood, suggests the need for periodic
reconsideration of the issue. Authorizing exceptions to the application of res judicata in such circumstances is appropriate.
In a third case recognizing a "changed circumstance" exception to the doctrine of res judicata,
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had issued its initial ruling constituted a sufficient change of circumstances
to permit relitigation of the forfeiture issue.
The court's discussion of res judicata and its very liberal interpretation
of the "changed circumstances" exception2 ' was inappropriate. Only a
single lawsuit was involved. The insurance company and the trial court
should have treated the motion to reconsider as a motion to reopen the
judgment pursuant to Rule 60, which provides for reconsideration of the
earlier judgment when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective effect."2"2 Alternatively, the court could have relied on
power to
a statutory provision which expressly grants the district 2court
3
set aside bail bond forfeitures whenever justice requires.
There is an obvious relationship between Rule 60 and the doctrine of
res judicata. Each seeks to assure finality of litigation while providing
that under certain exceptional circumstances, parties should be permitted
to relitigate an issue already determined. Rule 60 is carefully drafted and
contains explicit guidance for courts asked to consider whether the principle of finality should be sacrificed to accomplish other goals. The supreme court should insist that parties exhaust the remedies granted by
Rule 60 before they resort to general assertions that a change of circumstances justifies the creation of an exception to the application of the
doctrine of res judicata. Rule 60 provides sounder footing for analysis
than the catch-all phrase "change of circumstances."
New Mexico applies the traditional rule that only when the parties are
the court also focused on the changing nature of the facts in cases involving applications to appropriate
water:
these facts and information may vary from year to year and be subject to
periodical revision by reason of technical advances, new surveys, or additional
hydrological information. So it is that res judicata in the ordinary sense cannot
apply, even though there is identity of parties, issues, and general questions of
fact.
Cross v. Erickson, 72 N.M. 73, 76-77, 380 P.2d 520, 521-22 (1963).
211. The "changed circumstances" exception has been stringently confined to demonstrably
unique situations in the past. See supra note 210. In contrast, in Cottonbelt, the court did not carve
out an additional narrow exception, but seemed to suggest that the presence of any new facts or
changed circumstances in any case would warrant the refusal to apply res judicata.
212. N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). No New Mexico case has interpreted Rule 60(b)(5). Federal
opinions which have construed the equivalent provision have narrowly confined the scope of the
rule. E.g., Marshall v. Board of Educ., 575 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1978) (judgment at law for damages
cannot be modified under this section). Alternatively, the decision in Cottonbelt might be reopened
in accordance with Rule 60(b)(3) authorizing relief for up to a year after the entry of judgment upon
a showing of "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered
earlier." N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). See, e.g., Hill v. Burnworth, 85 N.M. 615, 514 P.2d 1312 (Ct.
App. 1973).
213. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-3-2(E) (1978), provides "[w]hen ajudgment has been rendered against
the defendant or surety . . . the court rendering such judgment may in its discretion remit or reduce
the amount thereof when after such rendition the accused has been arrested .... " See, e.g., State
v. Ramirez, 97 N.M. 125, 637 P.2d 556 (1981) (statute authorizes magistrate courts to set aside
judgments despite general prohibition on continuing jurisdiction of magistrate court).
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the same or "in privity," are the factual findings of a first lawsuit binding
in a second suit based upon a different cause of action. 214 Increasingly
our courts have been called upon to determine when the privity relationship exists. Two cases decided this year offer guidance.
In Poorbaughv. Mullen,21 the purchaser of land claimed that his realtor
cheated him in the course of a land transaction. The purchaser filed a
complaint with the state Real Estate Commission which instituted proceedings to review the charges. 2 6 The purchaser testified at the hearing
and attended the administrative appellate arguments in the district court,
but did not otherwise participate in the proceedings. In a subsequent civil
suit between the realtor and the purchaser, the realtor sought to apply
collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of certain facts resolved in favor of
the realtor in the earlier proceedings. The district court concluded that
the purchaser was in privity with the Commission and applied collateral
estoppel. The court of appeals reversed. The court found it unnecessary
to decide whether to adopt the rule that one who is in control of litigation
is in privity with the actual party. 217 Instead, the court concluded that
even if it applied the "control-privity" rule, the purchaser lacked sufficient
control of the first lawsuit. To meet the requirement, "the non-party [must]
have control or at least joint control of the prosecution or defense of the
suit .

.

. [and] must be able to control the decision to appeal or not

appeal." 21 8 The purchaser did not demonstrate the requisite control of the
earlier lawsuit merely by triggering the initial proceeding and participating
as a witness.
Shortly after the decision in Poorbaugh, the court of appeals apparently
embraced the "control-privity" test. In Mid-Century Insurance Co. v.
214. Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 96 N.M. 598, 601, 633 P.2d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 1981) ("it is necessary
in New Mexico that the parties in the second suit be those of the first suit."); State v. Rogers, 90
N.M. 604, 607, 566 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1977) ("IT]he application of collateral estoppel requires an
identity of parties in the prior and subsequent litigation."); See Restatement of Judgments §93
(1942).
215. 96 N.M. 598, 633 P.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1981).
216. The Real Estate Commission has the power to suspend or revoke a license upon proof of
misconduct. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-29-12 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The statute requires that "[tihe commission shall, before suspending or revoking any license, set the matter down for a hearing pursuant
to the provisions of the Uniform Licensing Act." N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-29-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1979).
These provisions have been repealed effective July I, 1984. 1981 N.M. Laws ch. 241, § 33.
217. Restatement of Judgments § 84 (1942). The Second Restatement of Judgments also would
limit non-parties who control the initial lawsuit: "A person who is not a party to an action but who
controls or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound
by the determination of issues decided as though he were a party." Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§39 (1982).
218. 96 N.M. at 601-602, 633 P.2d at 709-10. The court quoted language from 1B J. Moore
Federal Practice § 0.411[61, at 1552 (2d ed. 1980). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 39
comment C, (1982), provides that "[t]o have control of litigation requires that a person have effective
choice as to the legal theories and proofs to be advanced in behalf of the party to the action. He
must also have control over the opportunity to obtain review."
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Varos,219 the court concluded that an insurance company which supplied
counsel to represent the insured in a lawsuit was in privity with the insured
party. Therefore, in a subsequent action involving a party to the earlier
suit, the insurance company successfully asserted collateral estoppel to
bar relitigation of a finding made in the first suit. In the first suit, the
attorney for the insured successfully defended the insured against a claim
that the insured owner of the vehicle was vicariously liable for the actions
of the driver. Necessary to the first decision was the finding that the owner
had not given permission to the driver to use the vehicle. Subsequently,
the insurance company sought a declaratory judgment that it owed no
duty to defend the driver of the automobile because the company had no
contractual obligation to defend persons driving without the owner's
permission. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision permitting the company to use collateral estoppel. The court declared that
the insurance company, although not a party to the first suit, was in privity
with its insured who was a party. The court did not analyze the privity
220 Instead,
issue in terms of the "control" analysis set forth in Poorbaugh.
it merely cited an Iowa case for the proposition that "an insured and
insurer are in privity with each other." 22 ' This conclusion is consistent
with that of a majority of the jurisdictions which have considered the
issue.222 Nonetheless, the court should have determined that the insurance
company actually had the requisite control of the earlier litigation before
concluding that the company was in privity with the insured owner.
The decision has important practical ramifications. Last year, the supreme court ruled that a defendant's insurance company could sometimes
be joined as a co-defendant with the insured defendant. 223 Insurance companies, exposed as named defendants along with the insured, and now
bound by collateral estoppel to the findings in the initial lawsuit, are likely
to seek to participate actively in the litigation by asserting counterclaims
and crossclaims.224
One aspect of the Varos opinion is disturbing. Collateral estoppel bars
relitigation of facts only where the facts decided in the first case are the
same as the factual questions raised in the second case.22 5 In Varos, both
219. 96 N.M. 572, 632 P.2d 1210 (Ct. App. 1981).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 217-218.
221. 96 N.M. at 575, 632 P.2d at 1213. The court cited Stucker v. County of Muscatine, 249
Iowa 485, 87 N.W.2d 452 (1958).
222. IB J. Moore, Federal Practice §0.41116], at 1556 (2d ed. 1982).
223. Mauer v. Thorpe, 95 N.M. 286, 621 P.2d 503 (1980).
224. But see Campbell v. Benson, 97 N.M. 147,637 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1981) (insurance company
is only a nominal party).
225. "[E]stoppel can be applied to bar relitigation of any ultimatefacts or issues common to both
suits, and actually and necessarily decided in the first." Torres v. Village of Capitan, 92 N.M. 64,
68, 582 P.2d 1277, 1281 (1978) (emphasis added).
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the first and second case addressed the question of whether the driver
had the permission of the owner to drive the vehicle. In the first suit, the
permission question was asked in the context of determining whether the
owner was liable for the driver's act under the theories of negligent
entrustment22 6 or family purpose.227 In the second suit, the issue was one
of the interpretation of the terms of a contract. The insurance contract
provided insurance coverage for the driver only if he was driving with
the permission of the owner.228 Thus, in both cases, a question of permissive use had to be resolved. The court of appeals concluded that the
factual issue was therefore the same. This analysis is too simplistic.
"Permission" for purposes of substantive tort liability need not be the
same as "permission" for purposes of determining whether a contractual
duty to defend arises.229 Unless the factual question in the two suits arises
in the same legal context, the court should only apply the doctrine of
collateral estoppel if it is convinced that the different contextual setting
is irrelevant to the fact finding process.23 °
In Adams v. United Steel Workers of America,"' the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that when a lawsuit is terminated by a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice, no collateral estoppel effect attaches to the
226. See Bryant v. Gilmer, 97 N.M. 358, 639 P.2d 1212 (Ct. App. 1982); see also Hines v.
Nelson, 547 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
227. Boes v.Howell, 24 N.M. 142, 173 P. 966 (1918). See N.M. U.J.1. Civ. 12.10.
228. 96 N.M.at573, 632 P.2d at1211.
229. For example, the family purpose doctrine does not actually require that the driver be operating
the vehicle with the "permission" of the owner. The U.J.I. requires instead, that the driver "had
authority to drive the motor vehicle," a phrase which might be construed differently from "permission." N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 12.10. Moreover, New Mexico construes words orphrases in an insurance
contract "strictly against the insurer." Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Northeastern N.M.
Fair Assoc., 84 N.M. 779, 508 P.2d 588 (1973). This rule of construction could tip the scales in a
close case and therefore make inapplicable the factual conclusion that, for the purposes of determining
substantive liability, permission was not given to the driver of the car.
230. Another aspect of the decision in Varos is subject to criticism. In the first suit, the driver
and owner were codefendants in a suit brought by the estate of the deceased victim of the accident.
The owner sought and obtained a summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the
owner had not given permission to the driver to use the vehicle, and therefore was not liable.
In the second suit, the owner's privy, the insurance company, sought to use this ruling against
the driver who was a codefendant in the first suit. The general rule is that collateral estoppel does
not apply as between coparties to the first suit: "The rendition of a judgment in an action does not
conclude parties to the action who are not adversaries under the pleadings as to their rights inter se
upon matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between themselves."
Restatement of Judgments § 82 (1942). See, e.g., Putnam Mills Corp. v. United States, 479 F.2d
1334 (Ct. Cl. 1973). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 38 (1982), also provides that collateral
estoppel does not apply between coparties unless they are either "adversaries to each other under
the pleadings" or "actually litigate fully and fairly as adversaries to each other."
231. 97 N.M. 369, 640 P.2d 475 (1982). In this case, the court also dealt with the issue of res
an action against an employer for wrongful termination of
judicata. The supreme court held that
employment was a different cause of action from a claim against the employee's union for breach
of duty to carefully represent the employee. Therefore, res judicata did not bar an action against the
union after the court dismissed the suit for wrongful discharge. Id. at 373, 640 P.2d at 479.
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judgment. Adams charged that his employer breached the employment
contract by discharging him without cause. He also sued his union, claiming that it failed to represent him adequately during the course of the
grievance procedures. Adams voluntarily dismissed his action against the
employer with prejudice. 23 2 He pursued the action against the union. The
jury concluded that the employer wrongfully discharged Adams and the
union inadequately represented him in the grievance procedure. The union
appealed. The union's principal claim was that the jury should have been
estopped from concluding that the discharge was wrongful. The union
argued that the judgment entered against Adams in his suit against the
employer established that the discharge had not been wrongful. The union
claimed that Adams was bound by this determination in its suit against
it. The supreme court held that the prior dismissal with prejudice did not
preclude the jury from finding that Adams had been wrongfully discharged. The court found that the elements of collateral estoppel had
been met. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the trial court correctly
exercised its discretionary power to decline to apply collateral estoppel
when the first proceeding did not provide the litigant with "an opportunity
to fully and fairly litigate" the issue which was relevant to the second
proceeding.233
The court reached the correct result, but for the wrong reason. Collateral
estoppel is applicable only when, in the earlier proceeding, there was
actual litigation of the facts in the first suit. 234 A voluntary dismissal with
prejudice does not constitute actual litigation. 235 Therefore, the employee
was free to allege and prove in the separate cause of action against the
union that his discharge by the employer had been improper. The equitable
exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied only
when the elements of the doctrine have been met and the doctrine would
otherwise be applicable.
COMPLEX LITIGATION
Rule 19 provides criteria for determining when a non-party should be
required to join in pending litigation.236 If the criteria are met, the non232. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
233. 97 N.M. at 374, 640 P.2d at 480.
234. "Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by
a valid and final judgment .... " collateral estoppel applies. Restatement of Judgments § 68(l)
(1942).
235. The Restatement provides specifically that "[w]here no issues are litigated between the
parties, but the defendant confesses judgment, the judgment is not binding on the parties in subsequent
actions based on a different cause of action." Restatement of Judgments §68 comment (i) (1942).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment (e) (1982), also provides that "in the case
of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actually litigated.
Therefore, [collateral estoppel] does not apply with respect to any issue in a subsequent action."
236.
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the
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party "shall" be made a party unless joinder is jurisdictionally impossible.237 When joinder is not possible, the Rule directs the court to consider
whether it is appropriate to continue the lawsuit in the absence of the
person who should be joined but cannot be made a party. 238 Rule 19
explicitly provides that in certain circumstances, lawsuits can proceed in
the absence of "necessary" parties.239 Despite the clear language of the
Rule, New Mexico's courts have erroneously maintained that lawsuits
cannot continue in the absence of a person who ought to be made a party
but is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 240 Methola v. County of
Eddy24 1 marks a turning point away from these prior erroneous decisions.
In Methola, the New Mexico Court of Appeals clearly indicated that the
absence of a necessary party does not inevitably require the court to
dismiss the lawsuit. The court also held for the first time that a party who
fails to make a timely demand to join a person who should be joined
under Rule 19 cannot subsequently attack the judgment on the ground
that the court failed to order the joinder of the non-party.
In Methola, the plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries resulting
from the defendants' negligence. The plaintiff had received medical care
from two government agencies.242 Under existing law, the agencies were
subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against the defendants .243 Despite
precedent which indicated that they were necessary and indispensable
parties, 2 " neither agency was named as a party to the action. The defendants failed to object to their absence until the trial had commenced.
The trial court ruled that the action could proceed in the absence of the
government agencies. The court of appeals affirmed. Judge Walters ruled
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (A) as
a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, or (B)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.
N.M. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
237. "If he has not been . . . joined, the court shall order that he be made a party," if he "is
subject to service of process." id.
238. N.M. R. Civ. P. 19(b) provides that: "If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2)
hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the
action should proceed among the parties before it.
239. Id.
240. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 78 N.M. 359, 431 P.2d 737
(1967); Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957).
241. 96 N.M. 274, 629 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1981).
242. The New Mexico Department of Vocational Rehabilitation provided services to the plaintiff.
The Health and Social Services Division supplied medical care. Id. at 276, 629 P.2d at 352.
243. N.M. Stat. Ann. §27-2-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1982); see White v. Sutherland, 92 N.M. 187,
585 P.2d 331 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978).
244. See supra notes 240, 243.
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that a trial court confronted with a tardy request to join a party pursuant
to Rule 19 need not do so if the court can fashion
the judgment in a way
245
to avoid prejudice to the complaining party.
The opinion in Methola accomplishes a valid and much needed correction of prior New Mexico precedent. New Mexico courts no longer
are obligated to dismiss every lawsuit in which a person who should be
joined is absent. The trial court is free to continue the lawsuit in the
absence of a person who should be but cannot be joined, whenever the
court concludes that it is appropriate to do so. In effect, Methola overruled
earlier New Mexico cases equating "necessary" and "indispensable"
parties. 246 New Mexico courts are now free to apply Rule 19 in the flexible
manner in which it was designed to operate.
In New Mexico, a plaintiff suing for personal injuries or property
damage is often obligated to join his subrogated insurance carrier as a
coplaintiff.247 In Mauer v. Thorpe,248 the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that when the plaintiff must be joined with his insurance carrier, the
plaintiff may insist that the defendant's liability insurance company be
joined as a codefendant. The ruling seemed to authorize a direct action
by the injured plaintiff against the defendant's insurance carrier.249 The
245. 96 N.M. at 276, 629 P.2d at 352. In Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045
(1957), the supreme court stated that: "The failure of the defendant to raise the question of the
absence of a necessary party in the lower court is not to be commended." Id. at 403, 310 P.2d at
1053. Nonetheless, the court held that "this objection may be made, if not before, in the Supreme
Court" for the first time. Id.
Rule 12(h)(2) dealing with the waiver of defenses, provides that "a defense of failure to join a
party indispensable under Rule 19 . . . may be made at the trial on the merits." N.M. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(2). Judge Walters' decision is not inconsistent with Rule 12(h)(2). Because she held that the
agencies were necessary, but not indispensable, she was free to hold that the defendants had waived
their objections to the agencies' absence. Presumably, if the court concludes that the party is truly
indispensable pursuant to Rule 19(b), Rule 12(h)(2) and the ruling in Sellman continue to be authority
for permitting the issue to be raised for the first time at trial or on appeal.
246. The holding in Methola was made possible by language in Holguin v. Elephant Butte
Irrigation Dist., 91 N.M. 398, 575 P.2d 88 (1977). which acknowledged that the older New Mexico
cases equating necessary and indispensable parties might be incorrect. Id. at 401, 575 P.2d at 91.
See Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973) (court of appeals may not overrule
New Mexico Supreme Court opinions).
247. Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957).
248. 95 N.M. 286, 621 P.2d 503 (1980). In Campbell v. Benson, 97 N.M. 147, 637 P.2d 578
(Ct. App. 1981), the court of appeals held that the option given the plaintiff in Mauer to join the
defendant's insurer applied whenever the plaintiff's insurer is joined with the plaintiff. Even if the
plaintiff could have avoided joining as coplaintiff with his insurance company by use of a "loan
receipt," see Sellman v. Haddock, the plaintiff may compel the presence of the defendant's insurance
company as codefendant. 97 N.M. at 150, 637 P.2d at 581.
249. In New Mexico, direct actions by the injured person against the liability insurer of the
wrongdoer are not generally permitted. See, e.g., Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 376
(1954). In Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869 (1981), however, the supreme court
authorized a person injured by an uninsured motorist to proceed to sue his own insurance company
directly to recover on its policy protecting against uninsured motorists. It is not necessary to first
bring an action against the uninsured motorist.
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court of appeals this year construed Mauer more narrowly. In Campbell
v. Benson,25 ° the court held that when the defendant's insurer is joined
as a codefendant pursuant to Mauer, the carrier is merely a "nominal
party" against whom no judgment may be entered. 25 1 In effect, the court
of appeals concluded that the sole purpose of the joinder of the defendant's
insurer was cosmetic-to balance the potential prejudice flowing from
the presence of the plaintiff's insurer in the suit by providing for the
presence of the defendant's insurer as well. The decision does not address
the attributes that are possessed by the "nominal party" insurance company. Whether the insurer is sufficiently a party to require that personal
jurisdiction exist and service be made upon it is not yet clear. Nor is it
known whether the nominal party possesses the prerogatives of a party
such as the right to disqualify the trial judge, 25 2 or is subject to the
obligations imposed on a party. 253 These and other issues concerning the
2
status of the defendant's insurance company await resolution by the courts . -54
Problems arise when insured persons collect first-party insurance and
then seek damages from the alleged tortfeasor in workmen's compensation
cases as well as in automobile accident litigation. Unlike the rule applied
to other liability insurers, an insurance company which pays workmen's
compensation benefits to an injured worker is not a required party in the
worker's suit against a third-party tortfeasor. 255 Unless the worker assigns
his claim to the insurer, 256 the worker alone brings the action. The insurer
is entitled only to reimbursement from the proceeds recovered by the
employee. 257 This approach alleviates the problems which arise when the
250. 97 N.M. 147, 637 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1981).
251. "A 'nominal party' or 'pro-forma' party although joined as a party defendant, has no real
interest in the subject matter because no relief is demanded from it in the pleadings, and it is joined
merely because the technical rules of pleading require its presence in the record." Id. at 150, 637
P.2d at 581.
252. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978), permits a "party to an action or proceeding" to disqualify
the trial judge to whom the case is assigned merely by filing an affidavit stating that the party believes
the judge cannot serve with impartiality. Each party is entitled to one disqualification pursuant to
the statute. Romero v. Felter, 83 N.M. 736, 497 P.2d 738 (1972). See supra notes 64-79 and
accompanying text.
253. E.g., discovery rules provide that interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and
requests for admission can be used only against a party to the action. N.M. R. Civ. P. 33, 34 (Cum.
Supp. 1982), & 36. Physical and mental exams may only be obtained against a party or a person
under the legal control of a party. N.M. R. Civ. P. 35.
254. It seems clear that the defendant's insurance company will be deemed a party to the lawsuit
for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel if it is a named party. The court of appeals has
already ruled that the insurer is subject to the doctrine even where it is not a named party. See supra
text accompanying notes 219-24.
255. Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 365 P.2d 912 (1961); Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Kunth, 96 N.M. 631, 633 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1980).
256. The worker may assign his entire claim to the workmen's compensation carrier. If the worker
does so, the insurance company and not the worker is the correct party to sue the third-party wrongdoer.
Seaboard Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Kunth, 96 N.M. 631, 633 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1980).
257. See cases cited supra note 255.
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insurer is made a necessary party. Other problems are substituted, however, as the decision in Continental Casualty Co. v. Wueschinski,2 58 illustrates. In Continental, the injured worker declined to pursue his claim
against the tortfeasor when it became clear that the tortfeasor's limited
assets would barely be sufficient to reimburse the compensation carrier,
leaving nothing for the worker to realize for his own benefit. Because
the worker refused to litigate, the carrier filed suit against the tortfeasor,
naming the injured worker as an involuntary plaintiff. 259 The court of
appeals held that this procedure was proper. When the worker who alone
possesses the cause of action refuses to sue, the compensation carrier is
authorized to initiate suit itself in order to protect its interest in obtaining
reimbursement for the amounts paid to the worker. It is likely that the
introduction of involuntary parties into personal injury litigation will be
accompanied by as many problems as arise from the decision to permit
nominal parties. The time has come for the legislature or the courts to
take a fresh look at the problems which arise in tort cases when insurance
companies become subrogated to the rights of the injured parties. Tinkering with procedural rules to create nominal parties and involuntary
parties is part of the problem, rather than part of th6 solution.
26
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 0

The interpretation of provisions tolling the running of the statute of
limitations was the subject of two decisions of the court of appeals this
year. In Knippel v. Northern Communications,Inc. ,261 the court of appeals
held that the statute of limitations for filing workmen's compensation
claims was not tolled merely by the fact that the employee and employer
engaged in settlement negotiations. A statute provides that the running
of the statute of limitations in workmen's compensation cases is tolled
when failure to file was caused by an employer's conduct "which rea262
sonably led the [worker] to believe the compensation would be paid.
The worker relying on this tolling provision must show more than that
258. 95 N.M. 733, 625 P.2d 1250 (Ct. App. 1981).
259. Rule 19 provides that if a party who would be aligned as a plaintiff is needed for just
adjudication, but refuses to become a party, he may be made an involuntary plaintiff. N.M. R. Civ.
P. 19(a).
260. In Peerless Ins. Co. v. Davis, 96 N.M. 726, 634 P.2d 1278 (1981), the supreme court
construed the statute authorizing the revival of judgments. A statute permits enforcement of ajudgment
for seven years after its rendition. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-2 (1978). The judgment may be once
renewed for an additional seven-year period "by filing, for that purpose, a transcript of the docket
of the judgment" before the expiration of the initial seven-year period. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-19
(1978). In Peerless, the court held that the mere act of filing the transcript of judgment satisfied the
revival statute. No separate writing or other express indication that the filing was for the purpose
of revival is necessary. 96 N.M. at 727, 634 P.2d at 1279.
261. 97 N.M. 401, 640 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1982).
262. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-36 (1978).
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settlement negotiations were being conducted.2 63 Only a demonstration
that the employer led the worker to believe that compensation eventually
would be paid is sufficient to toll the running of the statute. 264 In Knippel,
the plaintiff's demonstration that the employer's insurance carrier never
denied liability and disputed only the amount of its liability was held to
be insufficient to toll the running of the statute. Where the employer
declines to make compensation payments or terminates payments which
had been made voluntarily, the worker cannot reasonably rely upon the
265
continuance of settlement negotiations to toll the running of the statute.
The lesson for attorneys representing injured workers is clear: if employers
are not voluntarily paying compensation benefits, file lawsuits seeking
compensation benefits even though these employers are participating in
settlement negotiations.
A statute provides that the limitations period is tolled during such time
as the defendant "may be out of or absent from the state . . 266 Tenorio
v. Cohen267 confirmed the view expressed in earlier decisions 268 that the
statute is not to be read literally. The purpose of the tolling provision is
to assure that a potential defendant cannot avoid service of process until
the statute of limitations has run.269 Where the absence of the defendant
from the state does not preclude the plaintiff from instituting suit, the
reason for tolling the statute is absent, and the provision is inapplicable.
In Tenorio, the defendants were New Mexico domiciliaries who were
absent from the state for extended periods of time, but who maintained
a home in New Mexico which was occupied by a house sitter. In these
circumstances, service upon the defendants could have been accomplished
by service upon the house sitter. 270 Because the defendants' absence from
the state did not pose a barrier to the institution of suit and service of
process, the tolling provision was inapplicable. The normal period for
the running of the statute of limitations applied.

263. 97 N.M. at 405, 640 P.2d at 511.
264. Id.
265. Id. InKnippel, the employer paid compensation benefits temporarily and then terminated
payments while continuing to negotiate. Voluntary payment of benefits tolls the running of the statute
of limitations. Saenz v. McCormick Constr. Co., 95 N.M. 609, 624 P.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1981).
Once voluntary payments cease, the statute begins to run. Id.
266. N.M. Stat. Ann. §37-1-9 (1978).
267. 96 N.M. 756, 635 P.2d 311 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 140, 637 P.2d 571 (1981).
268. Kennedy v.Lynch, 85 N.M.479, 513 P.2d 1261 (1973); Benally v.Pigmon, 78 N.M. 189,
429 P.2d 648 (1967).
269. Benally v. Pigmon, 78 N.M. 189, 429 P.2d 648 (1967).
270. "If the defendant be absent, service may be made by delivering a copy of the process or
other papers to be served to some person residing at the usual place of abode of the defendant who
is over the age of 15 years .. " N.M. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). The court in Tenorio assumed that the
house sitter was a "person residing" in the defendants' home. 97 N.M. at 757, 635 P.2d at 312.

